This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
A perceptual theorist might even hold that the experience of pain is never veridical (as some hold that experiences of color are never veridical). This “eliminativist” variant of the perceptual theory will be ignored here.
For important dissent subsequent to the publication of Consciousness, see Aydede 2009.
According to Hill, painful disturbances are “bodily disturbances”, “peripheral disturbances involving actual or potential damage” (Hill 2009, p. 177). That is not being assumed here.
See note 3 above.
For some helpful suggestions see Ganson and Ganson (2010).
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Aydede, M. (2009). Is feeling pain the perception of something? Journal of Philosophy, 106, 531–567.
Ganson, T., & Ganson, D. (2010). Everyday thinking about bodily sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88, 523–534.
Hill, C. (2005). Ow! The paradox of pain. In M. Aydede (Ed.), Pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hill, C. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Murat Aydede for comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Byrne, A. Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain. Philos Stud 161, 489–496 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5