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Recurrence: a rejoinder

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Notes

  1. As Salmon points out (fn. 17, p. 418), the definition of manifest consequence on p. 48 of SR is not properly formulated, at least on the most obvious reading. A proper formulation is given on p. 136n14 of SR.

  2. Thus Salmon’s charge that I make this assumption ‘without argument and with no notification’ (p. 423) is unduly harsh. I might add that his claim (fn. 25, p. 427) that relationism fares no better than standard Millian in regard to my disproof is also unwarranted. Salmon fails to appreciate that the formal definition of manifest consequence is only meant to apply to uncoordinated propositions. If extended to coordinated propositions, then it must be done in such a way that F&G(x) will be a manifest consequence of F(x) and G(x) when the two x’s in the premisses are coordinated. I had thought that this point would be obvious to the sympathetic reader of my text.

  3. I say a little more in Fine (2010).

  4. For simplicity I have assumed that F and G are purely qualitative so that there is no need to distinguish them from their existential counterparts Fe and Ge. I also talk explicitly of manifest consequence rather than justified inference.

  5. For this reason, Salmon is mistaken in thinking that I tacitly assume ‘that either I entails IF or I entails I′F’. I make no tacit assumptions, merely the explicit assumption that, in the presence of I, the inference from F&P(x) and G&~P(x) to F&P&G&~P(x) will be manifest.

  6. Fine (1985) is a general study of systems with such rules and of the system of Kalish and Montague, in particular.

References

  • Fine, K. (1985). Reasoning with arbitrary objects. Oxford: Blackwell.

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  • Fine, K. (2007). Semantic relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.

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  • Fine, K. (2010). Comments on Scott Soames. Coordination Problems, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 475–484.

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  • Salmon, N. (2012). Recurrence. Philosophical Studies, 159, 407–411.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY, 10003, USA

    Kit Fine

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Fine, K. Recurrence: a rejoinder. Philos Stud 169, 425–428 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0189-4

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