Abstract
An enduring criticism of public choice theory is that it does not adequately address the question of power in contemporary capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that the exchange paradigm and the principle of unanimity lead to a conservative defence of the unequal and unjust status quo of such societies. These criticisms are often presented as unanswered and unanswerable. Indeed, public choice scholars have tended to pursue their own research agendas rather than engage such criticisms. This article seeks to make good this lacuna by providing a defence of the public choice account of power. It is shown that within the public choice approach the exchange paradigm and the unanimity principle serve as idealized models against which to judge real world institutional arrangements. As such, these models serve as a basis for critique of contemporary capitalist societies in which all individuals may be subject to predation as a matter of routine. It is shown that the public choice account of power addresses the legitimization and limitation of power, whereas the critics of public choice in effect propose to allocate power to those deemed deserving. Hence, the public choice approach provides a basis for a genuinely consensual politics and exposes the fact that alternative conceptions of politics are fundamentally non-consensual. On this basis it is concluded that the public choice account of power in contemporary capitalist societies is superior to that offered by its critics.
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Notes
It should be noted that in The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 80) argued that constitutional agreement requires people to enter the constitutional process as ‘equals’ in terms of status and therefore ‘our analysis of the constitution-making process has little relevance for a society that is characterized by a sharp cleavage of the population into distinguishable social classes or separate racial, religious, or ethnic groupings’. Buchanan clearly revised this view in his later work, notably The Limits of Liberty—see, for example, the discussion of the emergence of slavery (Buchanan 1975a: 59–60).
Nozick (1974: 160–164) illustrated his entitlement theory of justice with the example of the wealth acquired by the basketball star Wilt Chamberlain in a fictional scenario. Taking as a starting point a distribution of resources that is considered just, which Nozick named D1, it is supposed that basketball fans pay 25c directly to Chamberlain (in addition to the standard ticket price) to watch him play. If one million people come through the turnstiles during a season, Chamberlain will acquire additional income of $250,000. Consequently, a new distribution of resources has emerged, which Nozick named D2. For Nozick, this new distribution of resources must be considered just because it has arisen via a series of just steps.
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Meadowcroft, J. Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power. Public Choice 158, 85–100 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9925-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9925-0