Abstract
This study evaluates the determinants of percentage commission rates in the residential brokerage industry. The model developed here predicts that market share of the brokerage firm, property selling difficulty, and prevailing market conditions influence commission rates. Empirical analysis using a sample of 14,891 condominium transactions from the Fort Lauderdale, Florida area provides support for the model’s predictions.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Weicher (2006) presents evidence that total commissions have declined from 6.1 % in 1991 to 5.1 % in 2004. While comprehensive data on the prevalence of these alternative broker compensation structures does not exist, Schnare and Kulick (2009) attribute at least part of the decline highlighted by Weicher (2006) to the growing popularity of these alternative compensation arrangements, particularly limited-service listings.
Zorn and Larsen (1986) compare flat-fee and fixed-percentage compensation structures, Arnold (1992) considers differences between the fixed-percent commissions, flat-fee arrangements, and consignment listings, while Anglin (1994) suggests that net listing contracts may best align broker and seller incentives. In Yavas (1996) the fixed-percentage commission structure maximizes the number of houses sold in a market but minimizes the total surplus for buyers and sellers. Conversely, the net listing structure results in the sale of fewer houses, but yields larger surpluses for buyers and sellers.
Schroeter’s (1987) model and conclusions have been directly challenged by O’Donnell and Geurts (1995) on the grounds that the equilibrium implicit in Schroeter’s model is not stable unless brokers’ level of service (specialization) is assumed to be fixed across all price levels of houses. Schroeter (1995) offers a defense of his model and its conclusions.
In Munneke and Yavas (2001), the incentive enhancement is for firms with 100 % compensation structures, while Johnson et al. (2008) focus on the same incentives at the agent level. Rutherford et al. (2001, 2004) compare exclusive right-to-sell and exclusive agency contracts. Rutherford et al. (2005) evaluate the outcome for broker-owners.
Other works include the studies of Johnson and Loucks (1986), Crellin et al. (1988), Glower and Hendershott (1988), Guntermann and Smith (1988), Shilling and Sirmans (1988), Sirmans and Swicegood (1997), and Jud and Winkler (1998). More recent studies which analyze agent or firm income include Carroll and Clauretie (2000), Jud and Winkler (2000), Muhanna (2000), Sirmans and Swicegood (2000), Zumpano et al. (2000), Epley (2001), Sirmans and Macpherson (2001), Benjamin et al. (2005), Benjamin et al. (2007a), Johnson et al. (2007), Benjamin et al. (2007b), Benjamin et al. (2009), and Martin and Munneke (2010).
All units are classified as attached to a structure that includes 5 or more units. Sixty-nine percent do not have a half-bath, 39 % have a water view, and 2 bedroom/2 bath units make up 51 % of the sample. The transaction price for half of the units is within ±30 % of the median price. The remaining heterogeneity is reduced considerably within each submarket. Differences in fixed effects across submarkets are controlled for in all empirical models. There are 20 submarkets and indicator variables for 19 submarkets are included in all estimations. Fixed effects for the omitted submarket are captured by the intercept.
The data here is for contracted commission rates, in contrast to actual commission amounts paid, since actual commissions would not be observed at the time of the listing agreement.
References
Anderson, R. I., Fok, R., Zumpano, L. V., & Elder, H. W. (1998). Measuring the efficiency of residential real estate brokerage firms: an application of the data envelope analysis. Journal of Real Estate Research, 16, 139–158.
Anderson, R., Lewis, I. D., & Springer, T. M. (2000a). Operating efficiencies in real estate: a review of the literature. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 8, 3–18.
Anderson, R., Lewis, I. D., & Zumpano, L. V. (2000b). X-inefficiencies in the residential real estate market: a stochastic frontier approach. Journal of Real Estate Research, 20, 93–103.
Anglin, P. M. (1994). Contracts for the sale of residential real estate. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 8, 195–211.
Arnold, M. A. (1992). The principal-agent relationship in real estate brokerage services. Real Estate Economics, 20, 89–106.
Bartlett, R. (1981). Property rights and the pricing of real estate brokerage. Journal of Industrial Economics, 30, 79–94.
Benjamin, J. D., Jud, G. D., & Sirmans, G. S. (2000a). What do we know about real estate brokerage? Journal of Real Estate Research, 20, 5–30.
Benjamin, J. D., Jud, G. D., & Sirmans, G. S. (2000b). Real estate brokerage and the housing market: an annotated bibliography. Journal of Real Estate Research, 20, 217–278.
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., Jud, G. D., & Winkler, D. T. (2005). Technology and real estate brokerage firm financial performance. Journal of Real Estate Research, 27, 409–426.
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., Jud, G. D., & Winkler, D. T. (2006). Franchising in residential brokerage. Journal of Real Estate Research, 28, 61–70.
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., & Winkler, D. T. (2007a). Sorting, franchising and real estate brokerage firms. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 34, 189–206.
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., Jud, G. D., & Winkler, D. T. (2007b). Do some people work harder than others? Evidence from real estate brokerage. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35, 95–110.
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P. T., & Winkler, D. T. (2009). Labor supply, flexible hours and real estate agents. Real Estate Economics, 37, 747–767.
Bruce, D., & Santore, R. (2006). On optimal real estate commissions. Journal of Housing Economics, 15, 156–166.
Carney, M. (1982). Costs and price of home brokerage services. Real Estate Economics, 10, 331–354.
Carroll, W. (1989). Fixed-percentage commissions and moral hazard in residential real estate brokerage. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2, 349–365.
Carroll, T., & Clauretie, T. M. (2000). A note on the earnings of real estate salespersons and others in the financial services industry. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 21, 315–323.
Crellin, G. E., Frew, J. R., & Jud, G. D. (1988). The earnings of realtors: some empirical evidence. Journal of Real Estate Research, 3, 69–78.
Dale-Johnson, D., & Hamilton, S. W. (1998). Housing market conditions, listing choice and MLS market share. Real Estate Economics, 26, 275–307.
Epley, D. R. (2001). U.S. real estate agent income and commercial/investment activities. Journal of Real Estate Research, 21, 221–244.
Fisher, L. M., & Yavas, A. (2010). A case for percentage commission contracts: the impact of a race among agents. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 40, 1–13.
Glower, M., & Hendershott, P. H. (1988). The determinants of REALTOR income. Journal of Real Estate Research, 3, 53–68.
Goolsby, W. C., & Childs, B. J. (1988). Brokerage firm competition in real estate commission rates. Journal of Real Estate Research, 3, 79–85.
Guntermann, K. L., & Smith, R. L. (1988). Licensing requirements, enforcement effort and complaints against real estate agents. Journal of Real Estate Research, 3, 11–20.
Johnson, L. L., & Loucks, C. (1986). The effect of state licensing regulations on the real estate brokerage industry. Real Estate Economics, 14, 567–582.
Johnson, K. H., Zumpano, L. V., & Anderson, R. I. (2007). Listing specialization and residential real estate licensee income. Journal of Real Estate Research, 29, 75–89.
Johnson, K. H., Zumpano, L. V., & Anderson, R. I. (2008). Intra-firm real estate brokerage compensation choices and agent performance. Journal of Real Estate Research, 30, 423–440.
Jud, G. D., & Winkler, D. T. (1998). The earnings of real estate salespersons and others in the financial services industry. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17, 279–291.
Jud, G. D., & Winkler, D. T. (2000). A note on licensing and the market for real estate agents. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 21, 175–184.
Jud, G. D., Winkler, D. T., & Sirmans, G. S. (2002). The impact of information technology on real estate licensee income. Journal of Real Estate Practice and Education, 5, 1–16.
Lewis, D., & Anderson, R. I. (1999). Residential real estate brokerage efficiency and the implications of franchising: a Bayesian approach. Real Estate Economics, 27, 543–560.
Mantrala, S., & Zabel, E. (1995). The housing market and real estate brokers. Real Estate Economics, 23, 161–185.
Martin, R. W., & Munneke, H. J. (2010). Real estate brokerage earnings: the role of choice of compensation scheme. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
Miceli, T. J., Pancak, K. A., & Sirmans, C. F. (2007). Is the compensation model for real estate brokers obsolete? Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35, 7–22.
Muhanna, W. A. (2000). E-commerce in the real estate brokerage industry. Journal of Real Estate Practice and Education, 3, 1–16.
Munneke, H. J., & Yavas, A. (2001). Incentives and performance in real estate brokerage. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 22, 5–21.
O’Donnell, S. I., & Geurts, T. G. (1995). Point: ‘Competition and value-of- service pricing in the residential real estate brokerage market. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35, 327–332.
Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2001). The impacts of contract type on broker performance. Real Estate Economics, 29, 389–409.
Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2004). The impact of contract type on broker performance: submarket effects. Journal of Real Estate Research, 26, 277–298.
Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 627–665.
Schnare, A. B., & Kulick, R. (2009). Do real estate agents compete on price? Evidence from seven metropolitan areas. In E. L. Glaeser & J. M. Quigley (Eds.), Housing markets and the economy: Risk, regulation, and policy. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Schroeter, J. R. (1987). Competition and value-of-service pricing in the residential real estate brokerage market. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 27, 29–40.
Shilling, J. D., & Sirmans, C. F. (1988). The effects of occupational licensing on complaints against real estate agents. Journal of Real Estate Research, 3, 1–10.
Sirmans, G. S., & Macpherson, D. A. (2001). Affinity programs and the real estate brokerage industry. Journal of Real Estate Research, 22, 337–351.
Sirmans, G. S., & Swicegood, P. G. (1997). Determinants of real estate licensee income. Journal of Real Estate Research, 14, 137–153.
Sirmans, G. S., & Swicegood, P. G. (2000). Determining real estate licensee income. Journal of Real Estate Research, 20, 189–204.
Sirmans, C. F., & Turnbull, G. K. (1997). Brokerage pricing under competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 102–117.
Turnbull, G. K. (1996). Real estate brokers, nonprice competition, and the housing market. Real Estate Economics, 24, 293–316.
Weicher, J. C. (2006). The price of residential real estate brokerage services: a review of the evidence, such as it is. Real Estate Law Journal, 35, 119–144.
Yavas, A. (1994). Economics of brokerage: an overview. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 2, 169–195.
Yavas, A. (1996). Matching of buyers and sellers by brokers: a comparison of alternative commission structures. Real Estate Economics, 24, 97–112.
Yinger, J. (1981). A search model of real estate broker behavior. American Economic Review, 71, 591–605.
Zietz, J., & Newsome, B. (2001). A note on buyer’s agent commission and sale price. Journal of Real Estate Research, 21, 245–253.
Zietz, J., & Sirmans, G. S. (2011). Real estate brokerage research in the new millennium. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 19, 5–40.
Zorn, T. S., & Larsen, J. E. (1986). The incentive effects of flat-fee and percentage commissions for real estate brokers. Real Estate Economics, 14, 24–47.
Zumpano, L. V., & Elder, H. W. (1994). Economies of scope and density in the market for real estate brokerage services. Real Estate Economics, 22, 497–513.
Zumpano, L. V., & Hooks, D. L. (1988). The real estate brokerage market: a critical reevaluation. Real Estate Economics, 16, 1–16.
Zumpano, L. V., Elder, H. W., & Crellin, G. E. (1993). The market for residential real estate brokerage services: costs of production and economies of scale. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 6, 237–250.
Zumpano, L. V., Elder, H. W., & Anderson, R. I. (2000). The residential real estate brokerage industry: an overview of past performance and future prospects. Journal of Real Estate Research, 19, 189–207.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Result 1
Substitute equation (3) into (4) and take the partial derivative with respect to σ, to get
Take the partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to σ, to get
because \( {\alpha_{\sigma }} < 0 \). Next, consider that
Equation (A3) is positive because \( {F_{{\hat{t}}}} > 0 \) and \( {t_{\sigma }} > 0 \) (as shown in equation(A2)). Combined with the assumption that \( 0 < {\phi_i} < 1 \), it is evident that \( {{{\partial {C_{{ij}}}*}} \left/ {{\partial \sigma }} \right.} > 0 \).
Proof of Result 2
Substitute equation (3) into (4) and take the partial derivative with respect to A, to get
Next, consider that
Equation (A5) is positive iff \( {F_A}{F_{{\widehat{t}}}}{F_{{\widehat{t}A}}} > \widehat{t}{\delta^{{ - 1}}}\left( {\pi + F} \right) \) because \( {F_A} > 0 \), \( {F_{{\hat{t}}}} > 0 \), \( {F_{{\widehat{t}A}}} < 0 \) and \( {t_A} < 0 \). Combined with the assumption that \( 0 < {\phi_i} < 1 \), it can be seen that equation (A4) is positive when the same condition exists.
Appendix B
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wiley, J.A., Benefield, J.D. & Allen, M.T. Cyclical Determinants of Brokerage Commission Rates. J Real Estate Finan Econ 48, 196–219 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-012-9387-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-012-9387-7