Abstract
This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific conventions, where these may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science, freedom, and democracy.
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Notes
I understand epistemology as defined by Georges Canguilhem to be the critical investigation of principles, methods, and results of a science. See Canguilhem 2006, 49–50.
On Carnap and Gestalt psychology see Kluck 2008, 149–181.
The literature on both Fleck and Polanyi is vast. On Fleck, cf. Schnelle 1982, Cohen and Schnelle 1986, and the Website of the Ludwik Fleck Center at the ETH Zürich (http://www.ludwikfleck.ethz.ch/). On Polanyi cf. Taussig et al. 2005; Mitchell 2006. Unfortunately, the long-awaited volume on Polanyi by Nye (2011) was published too late to be considered carefully for this article. I fully agree with Nye’s central argument, according to which the roots for the social and cultural understanding of science are to be found in the political context of National Socialism and Communism.
A complete bibliography of Fleck’s writings can be found in Fleck 2011, 656–672.
The sources on perception and psychology available to Fleck remain unclear to this day. Cf. Löwy 2008.
On Polanyi’s political liberalism, cf. Jacobs and Mullins 2008.
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An earlier version of this article was first published in German under the title „Sehen, Gestalt und Erkenntnis im Zeitalter der Extreme. Zur historischen Epistemologie von Ludwik Fleck und Michael Polanyi”. In: L. Bader, M. Gaier & F. Wolf (Eds.), Vergleichendes Sehen (pp. 575–595). Paderborn: Fink 2010. For the present version, the paper was revised and extended. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for critical comments and to Carrie Assman for her translation of this text.
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Hagner, M. Perception, knowledge and freedom in the age of extremes: on the historical epistemology of Ludwik Fleck and Michael Polanyi. Stud East Eur Thought 64, 107–120 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-012-9162-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-012-9162-6