Abstract
This paper takes the position that the aim of existential teaching, i.e., teaching where existential questions are addressed, consists in educating the students in light of subjective truth, where the students are ‘educated’ to exist on their own, i.e., independent of the teacher. The question is whether it is possible to educate in light of existence. It is, in fact impossible, as existence is a subjective matter, meaning that it must be determined individually. In this way the existential teaching appears thus: even though existence cannot be determined educationally, as it is a subjective matter, it does require some kind of education. However, the teacher cannot make use of pedagogical means that coerce the students to take responsibility for their subjective truth. A pedagogical ‘expedient’ is nonetheless required, which deprives of all types of constraint but still opens up for the students taking responsibility for their subjective truth. I argue that this expedient must be irony, but not all types of irony. I therefore discuss which conception of irony the existential teaching should and should not be connected with.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
This is neither an equal relationship between the teacher and student nor a traditional educational relationship in which the teacher stands above the student. It is rather an educational relationship where the teacher places herself below the student, but since this is done by way of irony, one may say that the teacher is both above and below the student. How so? Saying that the student is Christian while oneself is not, the teacher knows something which the student does not know, and this knowledge that the student does not have is the reason why the teacher stands above the student. In Praising otherwise I also suggest that the teacher ought to place herself below the student, but that is more from the perspective that teachers should make room for what students actually have to say (Saeverot 2011a).
It might even be claimed that a teacher cannot avoid deceiving her students, and if there is some truth in this claim, then it may be highly relevant to investigate, for educational reasons, a concept such as deception (Saeverot 2010). The main reason is that the more awareness the teacher has regarding the deception’s destructiveness and educational possibilities, the less risk of ending up on the wrong side of what may be regarded as acceptable and unacceptable educational action.
See Saeverot (2011b) for an elaboration of the problem with demystification, where the teacher presupposes that the students are deluded while she herself possesses the truth.
References
Biesta, G. J. J. (2010). Good education in an age of measurement: Ethics, politics, democracy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Derrida, J. (1996). The gift of death. (trans: Willis, D.). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1841/1989). The concept of irony, with continual reference to Socrates. In H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, VII. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1843/1983). Fear and Trembling. In H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, VI. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1844/1985). Philosophical fragments. In H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1846/1992). Concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments, volume I. In H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, XII. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1847/1995). Works of love. In H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, XVI. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1859/1998). The point of view for my work as an author. In H. V.Hong & E. H. Hong (Eds.), Kierkegaard’s writings, XXII. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Krüger, H–. H. (2002). Einführung in theorien und methoden der erziehungswissenschaft. Stuttgart: Leske + Budrich.
Lear, J. (2011). A case for irony. Harvard: Harvard University.
Nehemas, A. (1998). The art of living: Socratic reflections from plato to foucault. Berkeley: University of California.
Roberts, P. (2012). Education and the limits of reason: Reading dostoevsky. Educational Theory, 62(2), 203–223.
Saeverot, H. (2010). Educative deceit: Vladimir nabokov and the (im)possibility of education. Educational Theory, 60(5), 601–619.
Saeverot, H. (2011a). Praising otherwise. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45(3), 455–473.
Saeverot, H. (2011b). Kierkegaard, seduction, and existential education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 30(6), 557–572.
Schlegel, F. (1799/1917). Lucinde. Ein Roman. Leipzig: Insel Verlag.
Smeyers, P. (2005). Idle research, futile theory, and the risk for education: Reminders of irony and commitment. Educational Theory, 55(2), 165–183.
Smith, R. (2011). The play of socratic dialogue. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45(2), 221–233.
van Goor, R., & Heyting, F. (2006). The fruits of irony: Gaining insight into how we make meaning of the world. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 25(6), 479–496.
Vasiliou, I. (2002). Socrates’ reverse irony. Classical Quarterly, 52(1), 220–230.
Vlastos, G. (1991). Socrates, ironist and moral philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank the participants at the 3rd Annual Bergen Educational Conversation for their feedback and engagement regarding an earlier version of this paper. I am particularly grateful to Gert Biesta, Stein Wivestad, Solveig Reindal and Tom Are Trippestad for their helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Saeverot, H. Irony, Deception, and Subjective Truth: Principles for Existential Teaching. Stud Philos Educ 32, 503–513 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-012-9346-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-012-9346-z