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Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems

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Abstract

Carnap’s theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum. The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap’s theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven, Dekenstraat 2, 3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Jan Heylen

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  1. Jan Heylen
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Correspondence to Jan Heylen.

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Heylen, J. Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems. Stud Logica 94, 355–380 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9243-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9243-9

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