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Defending understanding-assent links

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Abstract

Several recent epistemologists have used understanding-assent links in theories of a priori knowledge and justification, but Williamson influentially argued against the existence of such links. Here I (1) clarify the nature of understanding-assent links and their role in epistemology; (2) clarify and clearly formulate Williamson’s arguments against their existence; (3) argue that Williamson has failed to successfully establish his conclusion; and (4) rebut Williamson’s claim that accepting understanding-assent links amounts to a form of dogmatism.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Boghossian (1996), Peacocke (1992), and Warren (2020).

  2. When speaking in generalities I will be somewhat cavalier about the distinction between use and mention.

  3. Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance was introduced in his (1965).

  4. See the discussion of acceptance in chapter 2 of Warren (2020).

  5. The use of natural deduction rules in formulations of inferentialism takes off from Gentzen (1934); for versions of inferentialist or conceptual role metasemantics see, for example, Block (1986), Brandom (1994), and Harman (1982). My own, unrestricted, inferentialist view is developed in Warren (2015) and in part II of Warren (2020).

  6. In (CP) the premise enclosed in parentheses and indexed by “n” is discharged at the line indexed by “n”— such rules, allowing us to discharge our commitment to premises, model our practices of reasoning under a hypothesis or supposition.

  7. In Boghossian (1996, 2000), Peacocke (1992), and Warren (2020).

  8. See Quine (1951) for the criticism and see Grice and Strawson (1956) for an influential response.

  9. Quine (1970), chapter 6. Warren (2018) contains an extended analysis and update of Quine’s argument.

  10. Quine (1970), page 81.

  11. At several points below, the distinction between rejecting a sentence and failing to accept a sentence is relevant. Often though, they can be treated together.

  12. His fullest discussion, the one I will focus on, is in Williamson (2007), chapter 4.

  13. Williamson (2007), pages 92, 94.

  14. Williamson (2007), page 94. The idea of the division of linguistic labor traces back to influential discussions in Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979).

  15. See Burgess (2005); Burgess credits Saul Kripke for first noting this error in early work on relevance logic. Williamson is aware of these points—see pages 40–41 of his (2000).

  16. This kind of disharmony is related to what Hlobil (2014) has called “inferential Moorean phenomena”.

  17. Looking ahead a step, something similar could be said for what I—in the next paragraph—call revolutionary logical deviance, but the ensuing discussion makes clear how and why there is a difference between the two types of cases.

  18. For intuitionism see Dummett (1973); for paraconsistent logic see Priest (1987).

  19. See Burgess and Rosen (1997) for the hermeneutic/revolutionary distinction.

  20. Well, what is obvious is that such a situation (as described in (1)) is conceivable; to get (1) we infer from conceivability to possibility. The validity of such inferences is an important question in the philosophy of mind (see Chalmers (2002)) but I think even those who reject the general validity of such inferences would be willing to grant that the way in which we can robustly conceive of the situation described in (1) is conclusive evidence for its possibility (even its physical possibility).

  21. Is it possible for someone to speak our language and assent to nothing? I doubt it. If these doubts are right, then we might argue that all speakers of our language must assent to the disjunction of all declarative sentences in our language. Of course, this requires an ability to form infinite disjunctions, something we might reasonably be skeptical about. In any case, this approach is more global and holistic — I think Williamson’s arguments can be answered even at a more atomistic level.

  22. For this positive theory building, see Warren (2020).

  23. See, for example, Quine (1970); Quine’s argument is actually more general since it considers a case of radical translation, but if upheld in the general case the argument will rule out homophonic translations in the cases we have so far been considering. See Warren (2018) for a recent updating of Quine’s argument, along with criticism of the original version.

  24. What is worse, Williamson’s (1994) famous epistemic position on vagueness seems to suggest that we couldn’t, in principle, have a satisfying metasemantics connecting use and meaning.

  25. Williamson (2007), page 115.

  26. For a start, see Warren (2020).

  27. Thanks to a referee for this journal for pushing me to discuss this aspect of Williamson’s case.

  28. Williamson (2007), page 126. I have suppressed a footnote in the original.

  29. Carnap (1937), page 318.

  30. Carnap (1963), page 921, in response to Quine (1960). Chalmers (2011) attempts to understand this Carnapian point in terms of subjective conditional probability.

  31. Williamson (2000), page 40.

  32. See Wikforss (2010) and Boghossian (2011).

  33. See Peacocke (1992), Boghossian (1996), and chapter 6 of Warren (2020).

  34. This paper was finished in a shorter but similar form in May 2014. After a few failed attempts at publishing, I put the paper aside for several years. I was heartened that a couple of the arguments in the paper found their way, in shortened form, into \(7.\mathrm {V}\) of Shadows of Syntax. Then in May of 2020, I discussed the paper with Soham Shiva as part of an independent study. After rereading it I felt that the paper was still a valuable addition to the literature, especially because (a) unlike my book’s discussion, it does not assume logical conventionalism, (b) Williamson’s arguments remain undercritisized in the published literature given their importance, and (c) the paper contains many points and arguments beyond those in the book’s brief discussion. So I updated the references and tried again.

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    Jared Warren

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Warren, J. Defending understanding-assent links. Synthese 199, 9219–9236 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03200-w

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