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Imagination and the a priori

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Abstract

What is the role of imagination in a priori knowledge? Here I provide a partial answer, arguing that imagination can be used to shed light on which experiences merely enable knowledge, versus which are evidential. I reach this partial answer by considering in detail Timothy’s Williamson’s recent argument that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is insignificant. There are replies to the argument by Boghossian and Casullo that might work on their own terms, but my reply examines the assumptions that Williamson makes about the role of imagination in knowledge generation. I show that Williamson’s argument does not account for important distinctions from recent discussions of imaginative content. When these distinctions are not ignored, we can see that Williamson’s argument attributes a subject knowledge on the basis of a faulty application of universal generalization. I close by connecting my positive account of the role of imagination in the a priori to a debate about the role of memory in the a priori that played out 25 years ago

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Notes

  1. In Williamson (2013).

  2. Most famously (Quine, 1951). That paper is focused on the analytic/synthetic distinction, but Quine is usually interpreted as denying the a priori/a posteriori distinction as well—see Putnam (1976) for an influential endorsement of this reading.

  3. This is an adaptation of Grice and Strawson (1956) defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction to the a priori/a posteriori case.

  4. I make a case for this in Warren (2022).

  5. Here I follow Williamson in focusing on knowledge rather than justification, entitlement, or warrant. Famously, Williamson (2000) takes knowledge to be more epistemologically fundamental than justification or the like. I disagree, but here set up the argument as he did. See Section 2 of Warren (2022) for my preferred set-up.

  6. Boghossian (2020) prefers “epistemic” to “evidential”, to avoid a connection to evidentialism.

  7. Williamson (2013, p. 293).

  8. Boghossian (2020) suggests that Williamson’s discussion on this point shows that it is problematic to think of propositions as justifiers, as opposed to mental states. I will return to related points briefly after discussing Williamson’s argument.

  9. Boghossian (2020) sees Williamson as presenting two arguments, the one I discuss and a more theoretical, less direct argument. Toward the end of the paper I address some points related to the general considerations mentioned by Williamson. And Casullo (forthcoming) discusses the connection of Williamson’s arguments here with both his general epistemological views and his earlier, related arguments against conceptual truth—see Williamson (2007).

  10. There is a weaker reading of Williamson’s argument, according to which the cases are not representative, but still show that not every case of a priori knowing is distinct from every case of a posteriori knowing. I focus on the stronger reading, since it seems to be what is needed for Williamson’s conclusion. See Section 7 of Warren (2022) for discussion.

  11. For example, see Kitcher (1984), Field (2000), and Warren (2022).

  12. For a historical discussion of the emergence of this type of approach, see Coffa (1991). See chapter 6 of Warren (2020) and Warren (2022) for my own preferred version of a meaning-based theory of the a priori.

  13. See his (2006) and (2007).

  14. From Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989), for example.

  15. See Section 6 of Warren (2022).

  16. In Casullo (forthcoming); see also Mallozzi (2021) and Section 6 of Warren (2022).

  17. Williamson (2013) does try to alleviate this worry by suggesting that our normal routes to mathematical knowledge parallel his account of Norman’s knowledge of (1). To avoid a long detour into the philosophy of mathematics, I won’t discuss this claim here.

  18. Again, these points are made in Casullo (forthcoming).

  19. Williamson (2013, p. 296).

  20. Williamson (2013, p. 306). Casullo (forthcoming) argues that Williamson is led to this (false) claim via problems in his broader epistemological commitments.

  21. Boghossian (2020) makes a similar point.

  22. Williamson (2013, p. 296).

  23. Williamson (2013, p. 298).

  24. In his (2007) and (2016).

  25. See the end of his (2016).

  26. This example is based on one in Williamson (2016).

  27. See the essays in Kind and Kung (2016) as well as in Kind and Christopher (2021).

  28. Boghossian (2020) argues that Williamson’s argument relies on a background assumption of reliabilism that is hidden for rhetorical purposes. Whether or not this is correct, Williamson’s overall account of the role of imagination in epistemology will certainly be congenial to many reliabilists.

  29. For some directly relevant work see chapter 3 of Peacocke (1992), Kung (2010), and Waxman (2019).

  30. Peacocke (1992) account of perceptual content is non-propositional, but Waxman (2019) adapts Peacocke’s approach to a propositional account. Kung (2010) treatment was also influenced by Peacocke’s account.

  31. Wittgenstein, (1958, p. 39).

  32. In saying this, I am just reading the quote at face-value, not engaging in serious Wittgenstein exegesis.

  33. In Kung (2010). In Warren (2013) I called the kind of thing that generated label content, “commentary”, but I did so in ignorance of all previous discussions of these issues.

  34. This example is based on one in Waxman (2019).

  35. Kung (2010, p. 625).

  36. Waxman (2019) has argued that further additions are needed to capture the dynamic features of imaginative episodes. See also Peacocke (1985).

  37. Williamson (2013, p. 295).

  38. See Mallozzi (2021).

  39. A less detailed version of the criticism of this section is offered in Section 8 of Warren (2022).

  40. Kung (2010) argues that it also can’t be used to bootstrap knowledge that something is possible—see his discussion for many useful clarifications and refinements of this claim.

  41. See Section 2 of Warren (2022) for some of those refinements, and my unpublished “Analyzing the A Priori” for more of them.

  42. See Chisholm (1977).

  43. In Burge (1993).

  44. See also the brief discussion in Section 6 of Warren (2022).

  45. Thanks to Paul Boghossian, Eli Hirsch, Daniel Waxman, and several referees.

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    Jared Warren

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Warren, J. Imagination and the a priori. Synthese 201, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03988-1

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