Notes
A very modest sampling might include Varela et al. (1991), Clark (1997), Haugeland (1998), Hurley (1998), Clark and Chalmers (1998), Rowlands (1999), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), O'Regan and Noë (2001), Shapiro (2004), Wilson (2004), Noë (2004), Gallagher (2005), Clark (2008b). For some critiques, see Adams and Aizawa (2001), Grush (2003), Rupert (2004), Adams and Aizawa (2008). It should go without saying that many if not all of the key ideas have longer and much more varied pedigrees. For a brief survey of these historical roots, see Clark (1997, chap. 8, sect. 8).
For a useful overview see Torrance (2005).
Clark (2008, chap. 8, submitted) argues against the existence of extended experiences.
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Acknowledgement
The writing of this paper was supported by the AHRC (Grant Number AH/E511139/1) and forms a part of the CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) Project. The CONTACT project is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme.
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Kiverstein, J., Clark, A. Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?. Topoi 28, 1–7 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4