Abstract
This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes.
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Notes
We assume that level C is continuous—it is characterised by instants of zero duration.
Note that our use of ‘extensionalism’ differs from Dainton’s use. He uses it to delineate a specific model with a temporally extended non-atomic level A, which we fit into our framework below. In contrast, we use this term to refer to a model that has a temporally extended supervenience base.
Another form is an antirealist version of retentionalism. Assuming they have non-extended supervenience bases, examples of this form are Kelly’s (2005a, b) retentionalism and antirealist versions of the following: Chaurd’s (2011) Husserlian temporal perceptual atomism, Watzl’s (2013) retentional view, a version of Lee’s (2014) atomistic view and Phillips’ (2010) memory theory.
Another example of the realist version of this mapping is the top left model depicted in Grush (2007) with a punctuate supervenience base. It is also possible that a version of this falls under Lee’s (forthcoming) ‘atomistic views’. Although he doesn’t give a cinematic example, his characterization allows for this possibility: they have a resulting experience that doesn’t have a C level temporal structure, yet may (or may not) have a content-derived temporal structure, and has a supervenience base that may or (may not) have temporal structure.
For this view to be classified as atomic non-extensionalism, however, the motion of the beam of awareness is not to be considered part of the model. Rather, the moving beam is only invoked to provide temporal relations among such momentary experiences.
For further discussion as to the nature and status of the specious present, see, e.g., Le Poidevin (2007, Ch5) and (2009), Dainton (2010), Kelly (2005a; b), Chuard (2011), Power (2012). Following, e.g., Le Poidevin (2007, 81–82) and Dainton (2010) who both criticise reject Kelly’s and Chuard’s usage of this terminology as referring to a particular model, we assume that the specious present is simply the doctrine defined above and, according to one’s stance, may or may not need to be account for by one’s model.
Other examples of the realist version of this mapping are the content version of Chuard’s (2011) extensional model (AKA ‘the specious present view’), Watzl’s (2013) specious present view, a version of Lee’s (2014) atomistic view, Phillips’ (2010) retentionalist version of specious present theory and his memory theory and, depending on the status of the B level, the bottom left model depicted in Grush (2007).
Other examples of the realist version of this mapping are Lee’s (2014) experiential process view, and, if they have extended supervenience bases, Kelly’s (2005a, b) specious present theory, Chuard’s (2011) structural version of the extensional model, a version of Watzl’s specious present view, the top right and bottom right models depicted in Grush (2007) and the version of Phillips’ (2010) Foster/Dainton specious present theory.
His approach, however, is more complicated than characterized here. For example, he assumes a central principle that relates the B level and A level. This is what he terms the Temporal Identity Principle: Experiences have the same timing as their realizers (2014, 3). However, he uses empirical illusions, experiments and the like in order argue against various strengths of mirroring relations amongst level C external events and level A. Further, he quickly claims that his principle is “very plausible, but won’t argue for it” in his (2014). So, although he assumes a particular principle regarding the relation between level B and level A, it’s not clear exactly what the status of this principle is, i.e., whether it has empirical support or is a mere presupposition.
For an overview of this model and its role in the literature, see Buonomano and Karmarkar (2002), Mauk and Buonomano (2004), Johnston (2010) amongst others. Creelman (1962) and Treisman (1963) are standardly cited as schematizing this model. However, there are several alternative models of duration timing proposed: Grondin (2010) for some such models.
Yet, some, e.g., Dainton (2004, 2010), do point out that they are at least aware that different modalities may generate further complexities in their models. However, seldom do they spell out how exactly such differences in modalities may be accommodated. Further, even supposing that such models could be ‘de-centralized’ in this sense, Johnston’s critique of the stopwatch model, as we explicate below, affects another shared feature of these psychological and philosophical models.
It’s a separate question as to whether the same neurons time all intervals or whether, e.g., one set of neurons time 100 ms intervals and another set time 200 ms intervals; these positions are regarded as compatible with both models. In turn, what distinguishes the two models presented above is whether the model is used to time durations experienced by all modalities, or whether the neural pacemaker employed is modality-dependent.
He (2006, 475) also claims to rule out the possibility that, perhaps, there’s a neural timing mechanism corresponding to each hemifield. He does so by rerunning the experiment with the 10 Hz grating being in different regions of the hemifield in which the adaption occurred. The gratings that appear in regions in which the 20 Hz adaptation grating did not occur do not exhibit a marked reduced apparent duration.
For an example of how classic models may offer a general programme for empirical study, see recent work in neurophenomenology. Some of it, e.g., van Gelder (1996), Varela (1996) uses cognitive science to investigate and develop a Husserlian retentionist model. For overviews of this programme, see Grush (2006) and Gallagher (2012).
This definition appears to parallel that of VanRullen.
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Acknowledgments
This research was partly funded by a John Templeton Foundation grant held by Alex Holcombe, Kristie Miller, Huw Price and Dean Rickles entitled: New Agendas for the Study of Time: Connecting the Disciplines.
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Kon, M., Miller, K. Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34, 201–216 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9251-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9251-x