Abstract
In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one’s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.
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Notes
Unless, of course, proper circumstances are defined as whatever circumstances make M reliable with respect to D.
Substantive epistemic principles might not be the only kind of epistemic principles there are. Some epistemic principles might be merely formal in nature in that they tell us only very general things such as that we should respect the evidence and avoid inconsistent beliefs. Formal epistemic principles are neutral with respect to which more specific doxastic practices one should use, and they don’t rely on assumptions about which specific doxastic practices are reliable.
This is a revised version of my account in Kappel (2012) which is intentionally similar in spirit to Lynch’s way of defining deep disagreement, though there are differences of detail, cf. Lynch (2010). Compare also to Fogelin’s somewhat different conception, according to which deep disagreement occurs in argumentation that involves disagreements over the norms governing the argumentation (Fogelin 1985, p. 8).
Thanks to a reviewer for bringing up this case.
Thanks to a reviewer for prompting this.
Thanks to a reviewer for raising this question.
Thanks to a reviewer for raising these concerns.
Note that Siegel’s remark concerns deep disagreement in Fogelin’s sense, not strictly the sense I have defined here.
For both notions of peers, we should of course distinguish between someone being an epistemic peer and believing or knowing that someone is a peer.
Thanks to Martin Kusch for suggesting this.
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Acknowledgements
Work on this paper was supported by the Independent Research Foundation Grant ‘Complex Disagreement’. Earlier versions was presented at workshops in Copenhagen and St. Andrews. Thanks to Alex France, Bjørn Hallsson, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Frederik J. Andersen, Giacomo Melis, Jeroen de Ridder, Thirza Lagewaard, Jesper Kallestrup, Jessica Brown, Jon Matheson, Josefine Pallavicini, Katherine Hawley, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch, Scott Aikin, Thomas Raleigh for useful comments. Warm thanks also to David Gooden and Pat Bondy and anonymous reviewers for this issue of Topoi for the useful suggestions.
Funding
This study was funded by Danish Research Councils (4001-00059BFKK).
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Author Klemens Kappel declares that he has no conflicts of interest.
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Kappel, K. Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement. Topoi 40, 1039–1050 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8