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A dual process model for cultural differences in thought

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Abstract

Nisbett et al. (Psychol Rev 108:291–310, 2001) claim that East Asians are likely to use holistic thought to solve problems, whereas Westerners use analytic thought more, and discuss the differences in the frame of the individualism/collectivism distinction. The holistic versus analytic distinction has been the greatest point of interest of dual process theories, which imply that human thinking has two sub processes. We apply a revised dual process model that proposes meme-acquired goals in both systems to explain cultural differences in thought. According to this, gene-installed goals are universal across cultures, whereas meme-acquired goals depend upon culture. To introduce a dual process model means that we discuss adaptation both in terms of culture and natural selection. Hence, we propose an interactive view that supports an adaptive relation between mind and culture.

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Notes

  1. We use the distinction between TASS and the analytic system when we refer to revised dual process theories.

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Acknowledgments

We thank David E. Over, Ken I. Manktelow, and Ara Norenzayan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. This was presented at psychological seminars at University of Wolverhampton, University of Sunderland, University of Wales, Cardiff, University of Plymouth, and University of Tokyo. We also thank Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Mike Oaksford, Toshikazu Hasegawa, Kai Hiraishi, Wai Ling Lai, and two anonymous reviewers.

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Correspondence to Hiroshi Yama.

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Yama, H., Nishioka, M., Horishita, T. et al. A dual process model for cultural differences in thought. Mind & Society 6, 143–172 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-007-0028-4

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