Abstract
Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism argues that the probability of our possessing reliable cognitive faculties, given the truth of evolution and naturalism, is low, and that this provides a defeater for naturalism, if the naturalist in question holds to the general truths of evolutionary biology. Stephen Law has recently objected to Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism by suggesting that there exist conceptual constraints governing the content a belief can have given its relationships to other things, including behaviour (CC). I show that Law’s objection fails, since it offers an auxiliary hypothesis to naturalism which is itself improbable. I consider multiple variants of the CC thesis, demonstrating that each is improbable, and that any weaker version with greater prior probability is compromised by a failure to render the relevant datum – the reliability of our cognitive faculties – probable. Thus, Law’s objection to Plantinga’s argument fails.
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References
Law, S. (2012). Naturalism, evolution and true belief. Analysis, 72, 41–48.
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function (pp. 225–26). New York: Oxford University Press.
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Thanks to Jonathan Rutledge and David Killoren for commenting on an earlier version of this paper.
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Miller, C. Response to Stephen Law on the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Philosophia 43, 147–152 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9569-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9569-z