Abstract
The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible.
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Notes
Of course, that has consequences for other questions; for instance, how is it possible at the same time to maintain both i) there exist necessary states of affairs, for instance, mathematical states of affairs and ii) everything which exists depends on God’s action? See Menzel (1987).
A certain amount of caution is necessary here. One could argue that there are states of affairs desired by an agent that are, in principle, actualizable, but there are some external obstacles which prevent the actualization. This depends on whether a no-obstacle condition is included within the requirements for possibility of actualization. However, there is no need to go into further depth in this paper because, when speaking about omnipotent entities, one reasonably assumes that no obstacles can disrupt their will.
Plantinga (1967, 170).
Actually, Pearce and Pruss (2012) try to avoid the two problems by modifying (W1): they use Lewis’ counterfactuals and the idea of counter possibilities to avoid McEar’s case and they shrink the domain of quantification to metaphysically possible states of affairs to escape contradictions. However, the very idea of counter possibilities is highly controversial and hence this attempt is not wholly convincing.
The question is if the single concept of perfection can account for the fact that God does not want contradictions, that can want everything that is not-contradictory, that wants only what he judges better and wants only good things. For instance, why cannot a will that wants a contradiction be perfect? In which sense are contradictions not perfect? And, even granted that there is a sense in which contradictions are imperfect, is this sense the same in which evil acts are imperfect? The concept of perfect will seem to be required to cope with too many different tasks. After all, the authors themselves admit that they are not able to give a complete analysis of this concept (see Pearce and Pruss 2012, p. 412).
The two principles would be equivalent if ◊W(x,p) ↔ ◊A(x,p) would hold for God. This equivalence is reasonable: if God can actualize something, then he can want that thing, and if he can want it, then he can actualize it. However, we don’t insist on this point and we confine ourselves to underline the affinity between (Omn) and (W2).
This thesis is extremely complex and ramified. A position that is in some ways similar can be found in Karl Barth’s theodicy. See, for instance, Rodin (1997). Barth’s Doctrine of God is in the second part of his monumental Church Dogmatics.
Obviously there are some exceptions; for instance, Swinburne 2008.
We follow the literature on this subject by calling the omnipotent beings Fred and Barney.
This solution could be a practicable way out for the dialetheist (see, for instance, Priest 2006).
One might attempt to avoid this conclusion choosing not to consider the actualization principle and contending that there can be two omnipotent beings provided that they never wish anything. One might also insist that this result is consistent with (Omn) and that these beings must remain inactive is a corollary that does not undermine this important fact. However, while an agent that can do something but that refrains from doing it is readily conceivable, an agent that necessarily, in every occasion, refrains from doing anything seems to clash with the meaning itself of agent. Refraining from doing something should be a contingent possibility that an agent may wish to achieve, not a structural feature of the agent. If this feature becomes essential, that being can no more be called an agent.
Ordinatio 1.2.1.3 is entirely devoted to the question of God’s uniqueness.
David Lewis deals with a similar question discussing the distinction between knowledge de dicto and de se (Lewis 1979: 513–543. He states that two omniscient beings can be distinct even if they know the same set of propositions because of what they ascribe to themselves (cf. pp. 520–521).
Actually, the main purpose of the authors is to reduce the paradox of the stone to the problem of the co-existence of two omnipotent beings. Since the authors believe that they have a solution to the latter problem, this solution can be extended to the paradox of the stone.
Baillie and Hagen (2008) have highlighted that Mele and Smith’s view is counterintuitive by developing a reductio of their thesis. If it were corrected, there would exist a possible world in which for every p Barney wants p and Fred wants ¬p. In this total disagreement scenario, Barney and Fred would actually be omni-impotent, i.e., they could actualize no state of affairs, a very paradoxical situation for two allegedly omnipotent beings (see Baillie and Hagen 2008: 32–33).
From (6) to (7) it can be inferred that the predicate Wg has the same logical force of a truth-predicate; moreover it allows the formulation of a liar paradox. Let p ↔ ¬Wg(p) by diagonalization; then for (AP) we have Wg(p) → p, whence Wg(p) ↔ ¬Wg(p), which is a contradiction.
For this characterization of voluntarism, cf. Descartes (1991), 2:291–2, 3:20, 3:25, 3:231.
A referee objects that it is one thing to believe that an omnipotent being can actualize contradictory states of affairs, it is another thing to claim that two omnipotent beings will and can actualize a contradictory state of affair. In the first case the capacity to will and actualize contradictory states of affairs might be seen as a sign of the unlimitedness of the power of God, while in the second case as a sign of the limitedness of the omnipotent beings. However, on the voluntaristic view considered here, an omnipotent being can actualize contradictory states of affairs without the contribution of other omnipotent being (cf. (15)) and, therefore, it is not limited in this sense. Moreover, suppose that Barney wants p and Fred ¬p, so that both p and ¬p are actualized. Is Barney or Fred limited? It does not seem so. Barney wants p and p is actualized and Fred wants ¬p and ¬p is actualized. Every omnipotent being actualizes what it wants and its will is not frustrated. He is not, therefore, limited in this sense either. However, it might be argued that Barney’s will can be frustrated for another reason. Suppose that Barney wants p but does not want the contradictory state of affairs p & ¬p. It is plausible to maintain that if Barney does not want p & ¬p then either he does not want p or he does not want ¬p. Let us see both cases: the first one should be avoided since we must admit that at least the will of the omnipotent being is determinate. So, it remains that Barney does not want ¬p. If Fred wants ¬p and, thus, both p and ¬p are actualized, Barney’s will does not seem to be frustrated. Once contradictory states of affairs are allowed, it is logically impossible to have cases of frustration of will, if we define the frustration as the fact that an omnipotent wants p and instead it is actual only ¬p. Of course also ¬p can be actual but this, prima facie, has nothing to do with the satisfaction of his will. We do not exclude that there are other ways to define frustration, but in this case we think there is no limitation of power. Finally, let us take into account a slightly more complicated case: here Barney wants p and he wants also ¬(p & ¬p). So, by definition of omnipotence, the following states are actualized: p and ¬(p & ¬p). However Fred wants ¬p. Then, we have: p, ¬p, and ¬(p & ¬p). Now it is relevant the kind of logic we are assuming; evidently it cannot be a Scotian logic since from the contradiction would stem any formula. It is reasonable to assume that the underlying logic is closed under the conjunction, so we get: p & ¬p and ¬(p & ¬p) and p & ¬p. The last two complex states are in contradiction but, again, once the contradiction is allowed, the form of the contradictory states is not relevant. In (p & ¬p), p could be atomic or molecular. In case at issue, p is in turn a contradiction, i.e., p & ¬p.
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Acknowledgements
A previous version of this paper was presented at SIFA 2014 Conference in L’Aquila. We would like to thanks the audience, and expecially Marco Santambrogio and Matteo Morganti, for comments and criticisms. The paper benefited from helpful comments by an anonymous referee of this Journal. Thanks to Giulia De Florio for linguistic advice.
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De Florio, C., Frigerio, A. Two Omnipotent Beings?. Philosophia 43, 309–324 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9598-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9598-2