Abstract
In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism (PQ) occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, the present paper takes a decisively critical stance towards PQ. In particular, it challenges it on two principal grounds. First, I argue that PQ's analysis of experience, and of the qualities tasked with constituting the phenomenal character of experience, is fundamentally flawed. Second, I argue that PQ's attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness as a function of reflective awareness is equally misguided. Along the way, the paper also points the shortcomings of previously established critiques of PQ. All in all, the discussion identifies some difficulties that are likely to generalize beyond PQ's specific circumstances, raising concerns regarding the viability of a "middle of the road" solution to the mind–body problem.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Although proponents of the view (Lockwood, 1989; Coleman, 2012, 2013, 2017a) speak about "phenomenal qualities" readers must be warned that such qualities are not, in themselves, experiential (See section III for a clarification of the position). Perhaps in order to address this terminological issue Chalmers (2017a, 41) distinguishes between qualities and phenomenal properties — where only the latter, but not the former, imply experience.
Sometimes, such an account amounts to nothing more than the formal commitment to the existence of underlying quidditas; other times, an effort is made to specify their nature. For an extended analysis of Russellian monism see any of the following: Alter and Nagasawa (2012); Chalmers (2017a); Kind (2015); Montero (2015); Pereboom (2015); Stoljar (2014); and Wishon (2015).
By "essentially incomplete" it is meant that science is not merely incomplete in the contingent sense of having not yet discovered all the relevant facts within its purview but, rather, that there is an entire dimension of reality, the inner dimension of things, which lies outside the compass of the ordinary methods of scientific inquiry.
It may be stressed that there are many different breeds of panpsychism: some are closer in spirit to idealism, while others to property dualism or even physicalism; some are constitutive forms of panpsychism while others are non-constitutive (in particular emergentist); some are framed in a bottom-up, atomistic mould (viz., micropsychism), while others take a top-down monistic form (cosmopsychism), and so on. In particular, not all forms of panpsychism fall under the generic banner of Russellian monism. For a synoptic view see Goff et al. (2020).
Among philosophers, Chalmers (1996), Skrbina (2005), and Strawson (2006) are three influential works sympathetic to panpsychism. Brüntrup and Jaskolla (2017), and Seager (2020), are two recent anthologies on the subject. Renowned contemporary scientists with sympathies to panpsychism include Smolin (2013) and Tononi and Koch (2015).
There are other combination problems (see Chalmers, 2017b for a review), but it is generally believed that the subject combination problem is the most serious threat to panpsychism.
While the relevant literature on panpsychism includes discussions of other problems (e.g., Chalmers, 2017b), the two mentioned above are the ones singled out by supporters of PQ.
Continuous, but not necessarily identical. There is a sense in which Feigl's view is weaker than the PQ discussed below. However, the details need not concern us here.
John Heil (2003, 234–235) gestures in a similar direction, although his account is less detailed.
The idea, traced all the way to Russell (1927), is that through direct access to intrinsic features of one's neural states one also establishes indirect access to the outside world perceived by, and through, our neurological apparatus.
In saying that the zombie argument constitutes an indirect assault on PQ I mean that it uses the method of indirect proof. While this is a powerful method its present application is such that, even if successful (and we have seen some reasons for doubt), it does not identify precisely which assumption, or assumptions, are to bear blame, nor why.
The distinction between these two constitutive components of experience is stressed by Levine (2001) who believes that it motivates a division of labor in our endeavors to explain consciousness.
By saying this I do not mean to imply that the process of visual perception is passive and reactive rather than action-oriented and anticipatory. My point is simply that more than any other sensory modality vision presents us with a world that appears stationary, stable, objective, self-contained-in-the-present-moment, and detached from us observers. The significance of this point is stressed eloquently by Whitehead (1929/1985, 121–124), as well as by Hans Jonas (1966, chap. 6).
Remember, our question does not concern such power properties as impenetrability or disruptiveness of the skin, for this would be like asking whether it is possible for the reflectance properties of surfaces to exist unexperienced. Rather, asserting the existence of Edenic colors is equivalent to asserting the existence of wholly unfelt qualia of hardness, pain, etc.
In addressing the question how could widely heterogeneous macro-qualia be grounded in a common core of micro-qualia Coleman appeals to Hartshorne's (1934) continuum hypothesis which views "phenomenal qualities, of all kinds, as on a continuum" (Coleman, 2017a, 2017b, 264). However, a putative continuity along the spectrum of phenomenal qualia does not imply the stronger claim that all macro-qualia are grounded in color-like micro-qualia. As a matter of fact, Hartshorne, good Whiteheadean that he was, was almost certainly convinced otherwise, namely, that "the basis of experience is emotional" (Whitehead, 1933/1967, 176).
See, e.g., Fernald (2000).
Notice that "feelings", as used here, must not be confused with the "phenomenal feel" of which philosophers are fond of talking. The reason is that the latter expression designates any experience (including, quite often, color experience), and bears no specific reference to affective phenomenology.
Ben-Jacob et al. (2011) speak of bacterial semantics and communication; Lyon (2015) proclaims the existence of valence; while Margulis (2001), as well as Baluška and Reber (2019), are bold enough to ascribe their tiny subjects of study the possession of sentience and awareness, or, in short, consciousness. For a more cautious assessment see Fulda (2017).
Here and below I use quotation marks in order to single out the fact that this strictly functional concept of awareness is a technical one and need not be confused with a commonsense understanding of awareness, an understanding that tends to view awareness as being constitutively involved with phenomenal consciousness.
I find the grammatical contrast between the dative and the accusative case rather helpful in clarifying what I am at. The accusative case is the direct object of a transitive verb, the dative is the indirect object. For example, in the sentence "I gave the boy the clock", 'the clock' is the accusative case while 'the boy' is the dative case. The clock is the object of the action; the boy is the action's recipient. Building upon this duality, and translating it to the realm of experience, I maintain that consciousness has two complementary aspects or modes: a perceptive aspect (or accusative mode) which consists in grasping intentional objects, and a receptive aspect (or dative mode) which consists in serving as the subjective medium for the unfolding of experiential content.
The relations between sentience and informational access is discussed in an earlier work of mine (see Shani, 2014).
References
Alter, T., & Nagasawa, Y. (2012). What is Russellian monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(9–10), 67–95
Alter, T., & Nagasawa, Y. (2015). Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. Oxford University Press.
Baluška, F., & Reber, A. (2019). Sentience and consciousness in single cells: How the first minds emerged in unicellular organisms. BioEssays, bies.201800229.r1.
Ben-Jacob, E., Shapira, Y., & Tauber, A. I. (2011). Smart Bacteria. In L. Margulis, C. Asikainen, & W. Krumbein (Eds.), Chimeras and consciousness: Evolution of the sensory self (pp. 55–62). MIT Press.
Blamauer, M. (2013). Panpsychism without subjectivity? A brief commentary on Sam Coleman's 'Mental Chemistry' and 'The Real Combination Problem'. Disputatio, 5, 37, 299–309.
Brüntrup, G., & Jaskolla, L. (2017). Introduction. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 1–18). Oxford University Press.
Campbell, J. (1994). A Simple View of Color. In J. Haldane & C. Wright (Eds.), Reality, representation and projection (pp. 257–269). Clarendon Press.
Campbell, N.A., Reece, J.B., Taylor, M.R., Simon, E.J., and Dickey, J.L. (2009). Biology: Concepts and connections: Sixth Edition. Pearson (International Edition).
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind. In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Perception and the fall from Eden. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual Experience (pp. 49–125). Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2017). Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 19–47). Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2017). The combination problem for panpsychism. In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 179–2014). Oxford University Press.
Coleman, S. (2013). The real combination problem: Panpsychism, micro-subjects, and emergence. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 19–44.
Coleman, S. (2013). The real combination problem: Panpsychism, micro-subjects, and emergence. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 19–44.
Coleman, S. (2017a). Panpsychism and neutral monism: How to make up ones mind? In G. Brüntrup & L. Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 249–282). Oxford University Press.
Coleman, S. (2017b). Neutral monism: A saner solution to the mind/body problem. (pp. 9–11). Philosophy Now.
Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. Vintage.
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and neurobiological origins. Nature Reviews/ Neuroscience, 14, 143–152.
Feigl, H. (1960). The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo problem. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind. New York University Press.
Feigl, H. (1975). Russell and Schlick: A remarkable agreement on a monistic solution to the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis, 9, 11–34.
Fernald, R. D. (2000). Evolution of the Eyes. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 10, 444–450
Foster, J. (1982). The case for idealism. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Fulda, F. C. (2017). Natural agency: The case of bacterial cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3(1), 69–90.
Goff, P. (2009). Why panpsychism doesn't help explain consciousness. Dialectica, 63(3), 289–311.
Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Oxford University Press.
Goff, P., Seager, W., & Allen-Hermanson, S. (2020). Panpsychism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition).
Gennaro, R. (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(2), 3–21.
Gert, J. (2008). What colors could not be: An argument for color primitivism. The Journal of Philosophy, 105(3), 128–155.
Goldman, A. (1993). Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition, 2(4), 364–382.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1987). Appearances and reality: A philosophical investigation into perception and perceptual qualities. Blackwell.
Hartshorne, C. (1934). The philosophy and psychology of perception. University of Chicago Press.
Heil, J. (2003). From and ontological point of view. Oxford University Press.
Holt, E. B., Marvin, W. T., Montague, W. P., Perry, R. B., Pitkin, W. B., & Spaulding, E. B. (1912). The new realism: Cooperative studies in philosophy. MacMillan.
James, W. (1890/1950). The principles of psychology, Vol. 1. Henry Holt & Co.
James, W. (1904). A world of pure experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, I, 20, 533-543.
Janzen, G. (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 30, 44–73.
Jékely, G., Colombelli, J., Hausen, H., Guy, K., Stelzer, E., Nedelec, F. and Arendt, D. (2008). Mechanisms of phototaxis in marine zooplankton. Nature, 456, 20 November, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature07590.
Jonas, H. (1966/2001). The phenomenon of life: Towards a philosophical biology. Northwestern University Press.
Kind, A. (2015). Pessimism about Russellian monism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. (pp. 401–421). Oxford University Press.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Harvard University Press.
Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 1–26.
Kriegel, U. (2015). The varieties of consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Leibniz, G.W. (1704/1916). New essays concerning human understanding. Open Court.
Levine, J. (2001). Purple haze: The puzzle of consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (1690/1995). An essay concerning human understanding. Prometheus.
Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, brain, and the quantum: The compound 'I'. Blackwell.
Lyon, P. (2015). The cognitive cell: Bacterial behavior reconsidered. Frontiers in Microbiology, 6(264), 1–18.
Margulis, L. (2001). The conscious cell. Annals of New York Academy of Science, Corpus ID: 5053446, 55-70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05707.xCorpusID:5053446,55-70.
Maund, B. (2019). Color. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/color/.
Montero, B. G. (2015). Russellianphysicalism. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. (pp. 209–223). Oxford University Press.
Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist Neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false. Oxford University Press.
Nealson, K. H. (2011). Early Sensibilities. In L. Margulis, C. Asikainen, & W. Krumbein (Eds.), Chimeras and consciousness: Evolution of the sensory self. (pp. 45–54). MIT Press.
Nilsson, D. E. (2013). Eye evolution and it functional basis. Visual Neuroscience, 30, 5–20
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotion. Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2015). Russellian monism and absolutely intrinsic properties. In T. Alter & Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. (pp. 300–323). Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1921). The analysis of mind. George Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B. (1927). The analysis of matter. Kegan Paul.
Russell, B. (1948). Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. Simon and Schuster.
Sartre, J. P. (1937). Transcendence of the ego. Noonday Press.
Schlick, M. (1925/1985). General theory of knowledge. Open Court.
Schwab, I. R. (2018). The evolution of the eyes: Major steps. Eyes, 32, 302–313
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information, and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 272–288
Seager, W. (2020). The Routledge handbook of panpsychism. Routledge.
Shani, I. (2014). Knowing how it feels: On the relevance of epistemic access for the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Mind and Behavior, 35(3), 107–132
Shepard, R. N., Cooper, L. A., et al. (1982). Mental images and their transformations. MIT Press.
Shewmon, A., Holmes, G., & Byrne, P. (1999). Consciousness in congenitally decorticate children: Developmental vegetative states as self-fulfilling prophecy. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 41(6), 364–374
Skrbina, D. (2005). Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press.
Smolin, L. (2013). Time reborn: From the crisis in physics to the future of the universe. Allen-Lane.
Solms, M. and Panksepp, J. (2015). The "Id" Knows More than the "Ego" Admits. In Solms, M., The Feeling Brain: Selected Papers on Neuropsychoanalysis. Routledge.
Stoljar, D. (2014). Four kinds of russellian monism. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), Current controversies in philosophy of mind. (pp. 17–39). Routledge.
Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 3–31
Stubenberg, L. (2016). Neutral Monism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/neutral-monism/.
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2015). Consciousness, here, there, and everywhere? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 370(20140167), 1–18
Wager, K. (2020). Panpsychism and cosmopsychism. PhD Dissertation. University of Birmingham.
Whitehead, A.N. (1929/1985). Process and reality: Corrected edition. D.R. Griffin and W. Sherburne (Eds.), Free Press.
Whitehead, A.N. (1933/1967). Adventures of ideas. Free Press.
Wishon, D. (2015). Russell on Russellian monism. In Y. Nagasawa (Ed.), Alter T. (pp. 91–118). Consciousness in the physical world.
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. MIT Press.
Zeki, S. (1993). A vision of the brain. Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
Many of the ideas discussed in this paper were presented in various forums over the last half a decade: the annual meeting of the Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy in Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul (May 23, 2015); the Canadian Philosophical Association in Ottawa (symposium on "Russellian Monism, Explanation, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness", May 31, 2015); International Conference on Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind, Huaqiau University, Xiamen, China (May 25, 2019); Consciousness and Fundamental Reality: Lessons from East Asian Philosophy (international conference held at Sun Yat Sen University, China in June 12, 2019); the Science of Consciousness (TSC) 2019, Interlaken, Switzerland (June 28, 2019); and the South East-Asian Mind and Metaphysics Research group, (Online forum, October 28, 2020). I thank the audiences at these events for their useful and thoughtful comments. Thanks are also due to Donovan Wishon for helpful comments on a much earlier draft of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Shani, I. Eden Benumbed: A Critique of Panqualityism and the Disclosure View of Consciousness. Philosophia 50, 233–256 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00377-9
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00377-9