Abstract
Some philosophers believe that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals would be morally questionable even if we had good evidence that doing so would achieve its goal, at least to a substantial degree. And they believe this because they believe that doing so would be an instance of “using” convicted criminals in a morally objectionable way. Tadros aims to show that we would indeed be “using” convicted criminals in such cases but that, while “using” others is ordinarily morally wrong, there are cases in which it is in fact morally permissible (or even morally required). Moreover, he claims that punishing convicted criminals in order to deter other, potential criminals is an instance of “using” others that is sometimes clearly morally justifiable. My aim is to show how extraordinarily interesting some of Tadros’ arguments are but also why, in my view, they fail to establish the view he claims they support. I also suggest some ways in which Tadros might revise his arguments to support his central claim(s) more effectively.
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Notes
It’s perhaps worth noting here that in critiquing one of my own arguments for the justification of general deterrence, Tadros writes as follows: “This argument is convincing, but its implications are implausibly modest. The limit on the magnitude of punishment would be based not on the gravity of the wrong itself, but on its [the wrong’s] effects on our security. …. [On such a view] … the amount of punishment that I would be permitted to impose on you would, in … [certain cases], be modest at best. It is difficult to believe that it is wrong to punish a serious offender if that person neither poses any future threat nor is responsible for eroding our security” (273; emphasis added).
Tadros makes it clear in Chapter 6 that, on his view, when one has an actual duty to rescue someone, given that the costs to oneself are not excessive, this is an enforceable duty, in his sense.
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Tadros, V. (2011). The ends of harm: The moral foundations of criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Farrell, D.M. Using Wrongdoers Rightly: Tadros on the Justification of General Deterrence. Criminal Law, Philosophy 9, 1–20 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-012-9198-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-012-9198-1