Abstract
The “context of discovery” and “context of justification” distinction has been used by Noretta Koertge and Lynn Hankinson Nelson in debates over the legitimacy of feminist approaches to philosophy of science. Koertge uses the context distinction to focus the conversation by barring certain approaches. I contend this focus masks points of true disagreement about the nature of justification. Nonetheless, Koertge raises important questions that have been too quickly set aside by some. I conclude that the context distinction should not be used to block feminist philosophy of science because the use of the context distinction is deeply ambiguous, masking underlying debates about naturalism and the nature of justification.
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Notes
Authors in the debate tend to use “philosophy of science” and “epistemology” interchangeably, although the context is usually within philosophy of science.
See Helen Longino on constitutive and contextual values (1990, 4).
See especially Gross and Levitt (1994).
Although this phrasing might make it sound as though the context of discovery always precedes the context of justification, Koertge acknowledges that in practice the two processes are not necessarily “temporally disjoint”; scientists might be continuously generating, testing, and altering hypotheses (Koertge 1993, 126).
Marxist dialectic materialism emphasized that nature is made up of interrelated, ever changing processes (Sheehen 1985, 38); some see Lysenkoism as more consistent with dialectic materialism than rival views in which individual genes controlled heredity, since genes might be viewed as inappropriately “individualistic” and deterministic (Sheehen 1985, 224). For an insightful critique of this view, see (Jarovsky 1970, Ch. 8).
The reader might notice here that I am interpreting Koertge as applying the distinction normatively to scientists. In contrast, I read Reichenbach as applying the distinction only to philosophers studying scientists, not to scientists themselves.
For more on framework assumptions, see (Putnam 1962a and b). For a nice discussion of Putnam’s views, see (Mueller and Fine 2004).
Part of why Marxist ideology was able to be so versatile is that it was so vague. See (Jarovsky 1970, 234).
Graham distinguishes between “authentic” and “calcified” dialectic materialism (1993, 119–121). I contend that ideology is problematic primarily when it is rigidly “calcified” and used by political entities to suppress and persecute those who work outside of a (narrow version) of the framework. Thus, the problem lies with political oppression, not the ideology itself.
Graham makes this point himself, after receiving criticism for linking both eminent and disreputable scientists with Marxism (1998, 7 & 26).
As mentioned earlier, Koertge tends to treat all feminist epistemologies as the same. There are, however, significant differences between views. For simplicity, I will consider objections and responses to features of Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s views.
Koertge is opposed to using ideology in the context of discovery, as well, if it will limit the kinds of questions scientists are allowed to pursue (Koertge 2003b p. 226, 227, 233), so it is not clear that she would find Anderson’s response (below) convincing.
Although an impressive work of reconciliation, I think Antony’s response ultimately fails to capture the full force of some of Anderson’s and Nelson’s worries. For a critique of Antony, see especially (Campbell 1998).
To some readers, this move may appear to expose Nelson’s view to the charge of relativism, a charge that Anderson’s view can avoid. Nelson emphatically wishes to reject relativism, and argues that her emphasis on empirical adequacy and reliability keeps her holism from becoming relativistic (Nelson 1990, 40 and 295). Unfortunately, I cannot survey those arguments here. Suffice to say that this criticism of Nelson’s feminist epistemology is distinct from the criticism considered in this paper.
Koertge offers a particularly vivid example of the dangers here: “The assessment of the probability that the O-ring on the Challenger will fail must be independent of how personally, politically or financially undesirable the result of that assessment will be” (Koertge 1993, 134). I suspect that Nelson and Anderson would both agree that this kind of “wishful thinking” should be avoided.
Pinnick expresses similar worries, making reference to “politically motivated science, such as Shockley’s eugenic or Brigham’s and Grant’s aptitude- and intelligence-test design” (Pinnick 2003, 22).
See footnote 18.
Popper writes, “It was the summer of 1919 that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories—the Marxist theory of history, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology; and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status. My problem perhaps first took the simple form, ‘What is wrong with Marxism, psychoanalysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton’s theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?’” (Popper 1963, 34).
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the participants of the 2009 Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice conference, as well as Ben Almassi, Asia Ferrin, Stephen Gardiner, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Arthur Fine, Alison Wylie, and Andrea Woody for their insightful discussions and comments on this paper. I would also like to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.
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Aufrecht, M. The context distinction: controversies over feminist philosophy of science. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 1, 373 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0031-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0031-9