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Exploring A New Class of Inequality Measures and Associated Value Judgements: Gini and Fibonacci-Type Sequences

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Abstract

This paper explores a single-parameter generalization of the Gini inequality measure. Taking the starting point to be the Borda-type social welfare function, which is known to generate the standard Gini measure, in which incomes (in ascending order) are weighted by their inverse rank, the generalisation uses a class of non-linear functions. These are based on the so-called ‘metallic sequences’ of number theory, of which the Fibonacci sequence is the best-known. The value judgements implicit in the measures are explored in detail. Comparisons with other well-known Gini measures, along with the Atkinson measure, are made. These are examined within the context of the famous ‘leaky bucket’ thought experiment, which concerns the maximum leak that a judge is prepared to tolerate, when making an income transfer from a richer to a poorer person. Inequality aversion is thus viewed in terms of being an increasing function of the leakage that is regarded as acceptable.

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Notes

  1. Indeed, a clear dichotomy can no longer be drawn between descriptive/statistical measures and so-called ‘ethical’ measures, since it is usually possible to identify implicit value judgements associated with earlier inequality measures; see, for example, Shorrocks (1988).

  2. Earlier papers on extensions to Gini include, for example, Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Kakwani (1980), Yitzhaki (1983), Chakravarty (1988), Shorrocks and Slottje (2002), and Chameni (2006, 2008).

  3. Other typical features of the type of social welfare function advanced by Atkinson include the properties of symmetry (welfare outcomes are independent of the precise personal identities of individuals), continuity (welfare does not change abruptly for small changes in individual welfare levels), and population-neutrality (the welfare function is invariant with respect to population replications).

  4. Atkinson’s independently conceived notion of an ‘equally distributed equivalent’ income was in fact anticipated by Serge-Christophe Kolm (1969) in terms of what he called the ‘equivalent equal’ income.

  5. Constant absolute aversion can be introduced by instead writing \({\Phi } \left (x_{i}\right ) =1-\exp \left (\beta x_{i}\right ) \), where β is constant absolute aversion, \(-{\Phi }^{\prime \prime }\left (x_{i}\right ) /{\Phi }^{\prime }\left (x_{i}\right ) \). In addition, an intermediate case is given by \({\Phi } \left (x_{i}\right ) =\left (x_{i}+x_{0}\right )^{1-\varepsilon }/\left (1-\varepsilon \right ) \) for ε≠ 1. However, these alternatives have received little attention compared with the constant relative inequality aversion case used by Atkinson.

  6. The experiment has formed the basis of attempts to measure indirectly the nature of individuals’ aversion to inequality: see Amiel et al. (1999). On the relation between the leaky bucket and the Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers, see Lasso de la Vega and Seidl (2007).

  7. Their result was based on a result by Stuart (1954) on the correlation between values and ranks in samples from continuous distributions.

  8. Muliere and Scarsini (1989) showed that if the contribution of any v-tuple of individuals is equal to the income of the poorest person, the average social welfare of all v-tuples is \(\bar {x}\left (1-G\left (v\right ) \right ) \), namely the abbreviated function discussed below. For practical computations, it is not advisable to use the covariance form for v > 2, as the resulting \(G\left (v\right ) \) may not be monotonic: see Schechtman and Zitikis (2006, p. 390). On calculations, see also Schechtman and Yitzhaki (2008).

  9. The French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda (1733–1799) proposed, in 1781, in the context of a voting system where candidates are ranked by voters, a points scoring system in which options are given scores equal to their reverse rank positions. Aggregation of scores over all voters then gives the winner as the one with the highest total score. The properties of the ‘Borda Rule’, and its application to a variety of aggregation settings (including committee decisions, social welfare judgements, and normative indicators such as poverty, inequality, real national income) have been intensively investigated by Sen (1977).

  10. For example, Kakwani (1980) used the form, \(\widetilde {W}=\bar {x}/\left (1+G\right ) \), while Dagum (1990) used \(\widetilde {W}=\bar {x}\left (1-G\right ) /\left (1+G\right ) \). These are examined in detail in Creedy and Hurn (1999). Shorrocks (1988) used \(\widetilde {W}=\bar {x}\exp (I),\) while de V. Graaff (1977) suggested \(\widetilde {W}=\bar {x}\left (1-I\right )^{\theta }\).

  11. Although it was known much earlier, the series \(f_{1}\left (i\right ) \) is named after the Italian mathematician Leonardo Bonacci (1170–approx 1240), better known simply as Fibonacci. The series \(f_{2}\left (i\right ) \) is named after the English mathematician, John Pell (1611–1685), although again it was known before Pell. It is also sometimes known as the Pell-Lucas series, after the French mathematician Francois Lucas (1842–1891).

  12. Furthermore, these are special cases of the Generalised secondary Fibonacci sequence given by: a,b,pb + qa,p(pb + qa) + qb, and so on, for which \(f\left (i\right ) /f\left (i-1\right ) \) approaches \(0.5\left (p+\sqrt {p^{2}+4q} \right ) \).

  13. The relationship between \(A\left (\varepsilon \right ) \) and ε is examined in detail in Creedy (2019).

    Figure 3
    figure 3

    Alternative Gini and Atkinson Measures for Hypothetical Distribution

  14. However, there are slight differences in this small-population case.

    Table 2 Leak Tolerated, in cents, When Transfering One Dollar to Lower-Ranked Person: Extended Gini
  15. For a very useful text on the mathematics of metallic sequences, see Koshy (2001).

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the referees for helpful suggestions.

Funding

Creedy’s work on this paper is part of a project on ‘Measuring Income Inequality, Poverty, and Mobility in New Zealand’, funded by an Endeavour Research Grant from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and awarded to the Chair in Public Finance at Victoria University of Wellington. Subramanian did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work.

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Appendix: Derivation of the Pell Index of Inequality

Appendix: Derivation of the Pell Index of Inequality

This appendix provides a short derivation of the metallic ratio expression for the ‘Pell Index’ of inequality, denoted G2 above and shown in equation (3.10). The derivation makes use of the following two standard results relating to the Pell number sequence: Footnote 15

(a):

The n th term of the Pell sequence, \(P\left (n\right ) \), can be approximated by \(\delta ^{n}/\left (2\sqrt {2}\right ) \), where δ is the ‘silver ratio’, \(\delta =1+\sqrt {2}\).

(b):

The sum of the first n Pell numbers, \({\sum }_{i=1}^{n}P\left (i\right ) \), is \([ 3P\left (n\right ) +P\left (n-1\right ) -1] /2\). In terms of the approximation in (a) and after some manipulation, this can be written as:

$$ {\sum}_{i=1}^{n}P\left( i\right) =\frac{\delta^{n-1}\left( 3\delta +1\right) -2\sqrt{2}}{4\sqrt{2}} $$
(A.1)

Using (16), the Pell inequality index is derived from the function, W2. Write WP = W2, and using the notation introduced in Section 3, for any ordered n-vector of incomes \(\mathbf {x=}\left (x_{1},...,x_{n}\right ) \):

$$ W_{P}\left( \mathbf{x}\right) =\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}S_{2}\left( i\right) x_{i}={\sum}_{i=1}^{n}P\left( n+1-i\right) x_{i} $$
(A.2)

Making use of result (b) stated above, this becomes:

$$ W_{P}\left( \mathbf{x}\right) =\frac{\left( 3\delta +1\right) {\sum}_{i=1}^{n}\delta^{n-i}x_{i}-\left( 2\sqrt{2}\right) n\bar{x}}{4\sqrt{2}} $$
(A.3)

The equally distributed equivalent, xE,P, using (17), is given by:

$$ x_{E,P}=\frac{W_{P}\left( \mathbf{x}\right) }{{\sum}_{i=1}^{n}P\left( n+1-i\right) } $$
(A.4)

Using, again, result (b) stated above:

$$ \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}P\left( n+1-i\right) =\frac{1}{4\sqrt{2}}\left[ \left( 3\delta +1\right) \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}\delta^{n-i}-2n\sqrt{2}\right] $$
(A.5)

But \({\sum }_{i=1}^{n}\delta ^{n-i}=\left (\delta ^{n}-1\right ) /\sqrt {2}\), and making the appropriate substitution yields:

$$ \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}P\left( n+1-i\right) =\left[ \left( 3\delta +1\right) \left( \delta^{n}-1\right) -4n\right] /8 $$
(A.6)

Using (A.3), (A.4) and (A.6), the equally distributed equivalent is:

$$ x_{E,P}=\left( \frac{8}{4\sqrt{2}}\right) \frac{\left( 3\delta +1\right) {\sum}_{i=1}^{n}\delta^{n-i}x_{i}-2n\bar{x}\sqrt{2}}{\left( 3\delta +1\right) \left( \delta^{n}-1\right) -4n} $$
(A.7)

This simplifies to:

$$ x_{E,P}=\frac{\left( 3\delta +1\right) \sqrt{2}{\sum}_{i=1}^{n}\delta^{n-i}x_{i}-4n\bar{x}}{\left( 3\delta +1\right) \left( \delta^{n}-1\right) -4n} $$
(A.8)

The Pell index is the proportional deviation of the equally distributed equivalent income from the arithmetic mean, \(G_{P}=1-x_{E,P}/\bar {x}\). Using (A.8), this gives the result in equation (3.10).

As a check, the exact value of the Fibonacci and Pell inequality indices, as given in equation (3.16), can be compared with the ‘metallic ratio’ approximations as given by equations (3.9) and (3.10) respectively, for a hypothetical income distribution. Consider the ten-person ordered distribution \(\left (20,30,50,55,60,75,90,120,140\right ) \) used in Section 3.3 above. It turns out that, for this distribution, the exact and approximate values, as given by (3.6), for k = 1, and (3.9) respectively for the Fibonacci index are 0.5325 and 0.5255. The corresponding exact and approximate values for the Pell index, given by (3.6), for k = 2, and (3.10) respectively, are 0.6404 and 0.6441.

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Creedy, J., Subramanian, S. Exploring A New Class of Inequality Measures and Associated Value Judgements: Gini and Fibonacci-Type Sequences. Sankhya B 85, 110–131 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13571-023-00302-y

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