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Two Projects for Understanding the Mind: A Response to Morris and Richardson

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Abstract

We respond to Morris and Richardson's (1995) claim that Pickering and Chater's (1995) arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only possible for aspects of those processes that do not make reference to general knowledge. We conclude that consideration of the issues raised by Morris and Richardson reinforces our original claim that there are two fundamentally distinct projects for understanding the mind, one based on justification, and the other on computational explanation, and that these apply to non-overlapping aspects of mental life.

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Chater, N., Pickering, M. Two Projects for Understanding the Mind: A Response to Morris and Richardson. Minds and Machines 7, 553–569 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008264330143

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