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Governance Structures, Coordination Mechanisms and Cognitive Models

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Abstract

This paper criticizes the current prevailing ways ofmodelling governance alternatives, and advocates theopportunity and feasibility of a reconceptualizationof governance forms as mixes or configurations ofsimpler and potentially disentangleablecomponents. These components are constituted by abundle of property rights and by a set of coordinationmechanisms. The paper draws on a previous effort atintegrating economic, organizational and sociologicaltheories of governance in a cognitive perspective(Grandori 1995a) and explicitates how some cognitivefoundations of organization theory can be revised tosustain a more fine-grained view of governance. Theimplications for organization design are illustratedin the final section through the solution of someempirical design problems, as well as through areinterpretation of known hybrid arrangements.

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  1. Università di Modena and Università L. Bocconi, Viale Isonzo 23, 20136, Milano, Italy

    Anna Grandori

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Grandori, A. Governance Structures, Coordination Mechanisms and Cognitive Models. Journal of Management & Governance 1, 29–47 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009977627870

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