Abstract
According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.
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Pruss, A.R. The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism. Philosophical Studies 104, 169–178 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010304927119
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010304927119