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Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects

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Abstract

I argue that a solution to puzzles concerning the relationship ofobjects and their properties – a version of the `bundle' theory ofparticulars according to which ordinary objects are mereologicalfusions of monadic and relational tropes – is also a solution topuzzles of material constitution involving the allegedco-location of material objects. Additionally, two argumentsthat have played a prominent role in shaping the current debate,Mark Heller's argument for Four Dimensionalism and Peter vanInwagen's argument against Mereological Universalism, are shownto be unsound given this version of the bundle theory.

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  1. University of Massachusetts, Amherst

    Kris McDaniel

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  1. Kris McDaniel
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McDaniel, K. Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects. Philosophical Studies 104, 269–290 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010310503120

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