Abstract
We describe a uniform semantic representation for a number of systems of brave (credulous) nonmonotonic inference based on the notion of an epistemic state. A complete characterization for the main such systems is given. It turns out that both sceptical and credulous inference are representable syntactically as diverging extensions of the basic conditional logic suggested by van Benthem in [27].
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Bochman, A. Brave Nonmonotonic Inference and Its Kinds. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 39, 101–121 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024456630690
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024456630690