Abstract
Employing the framework of conflicting goals in democracy promotion as a departure point, the paper addresses the issue of arms exports to non-democratic countries as an important research topic which points to a reconsideration of certain fundamental conceptual and normative commitments underpinning democracy promotion. Empirically, we remind of the lingering hypocrisy of Western arms exporters, knowing that exports to non-democratic countries often hinder or block democratisation. This is not easily circumvented because of the many conflicting objectives both internal and external to democracy promotion itself. Yet, democracy and human rights promotion remain, ethically and pragmatically, important policy goals. Noting that the self-evident character of the state-based liberal democratic model is being increasingly questioned in the literature, we then critically explore a radical, and surprisingly natural, alternative vision: namely, if the commitment to democracy and human rights is to be genuine, only global democracy remains a viable way of resolving the many dilemmas, as it aspires to deal both with regulating arms exports and building accountable decision-making structures. Although we ultimately reject the globalist solution and lean towards a less radical constructivist approach, we endorse the underlying rationale that democracy promotion needs to embrace normative democratic theory sincerely.
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Notes
We will use in this paper the notion of democracy promotion as covering also the related modalities of advancing democracy abroad, such as democracy support, democracy assistance, democracy-building, and so on. We believe that no substantial part of our argument hinges on this terminological choice, although we are aware of the voices which point out the negative connotations of DP, stemming from its linkage to the recent practice of armed intervention in non-democratic countries.
The former refers to situations where there is a conflict of goals or instruments which are tied to DP itself; a typical example is the common dilemma between organising free nation-wide elections and ensuring equitable access to power to representatives of all significant segments of the given society (for example by means of power-sharing arrangements). Extrinsic trade-offs refer to cases when DP as such clashes with other valuable social goals or priorities of the involved actors, such as peace-building, state-building, economic development, or—most relevantly for our purposes—calculations of economic benefit (Grimm and Leininger 2012, pp. 397–98).
In the normative phase, conflicts arise both intrinsically between competing visions of what type (model) of democracy is most desirable (think of liberal individualist vs. Confucian collectivist versus socialist egalitarian conceptions) and extrinsically between democracy and other goals and ideals that are in themselves valuable (peace, welfare and justice, stability, etc.). The strategic phase stands for (both intrinsic and extrinsic) ‘conflicts of appropriate timing, sequencing, and systemic interdependence’ (Grimm and Leininger 2012, p. 401). These may be triggered by differing political, cultural, and economic motivations of the involved actors. Examples include the need to supply governments with military equipment, so that anti-democratic forces are kept at bay, versus the ever-present danger of their abuse against any opposition forces. The operative phase describes the ‘micro level’ of disputes over implementation, e.g. prioritisation of certain policy steps.
Such as the socio-political and economic condition of recipient countries; the nature of interaction between international and domestic actors (i.e. promoters and recipients), especially the extent of inclusion of the latter in decisions about DP policies; or the degree or lack of capacity to actually carry out the suggested policies. Assigning priority among competing goals should thus be sensitive to questions such as whether the given country is an authoritarian or transitioning regime, whether violent clashes are imminent or remote, or whether the nature of the democracy-to-be-achieved is relatively open or pre-defined by external actors (Grimm and Leininger 2012, 402ff).
As a matter of fact, member states of the United Nations most likely have the (legal) right to purchase arms from abroad, stemming from Article 51 of the UN Charter. This, however, does not entail a (legal) duty to sell, although a case could perhaps be made for a moral one. In any case, this paper does not deal with such examples.
We comment upon other typical arguments in defence of arms exports throughout the article; for a systematic (critical) exposition see Christensen (2015).
See, for example, O’Donnell’s (2010, p. 7) recounting of the powerlessness of ordinary citizens vis-à-vis the machinery of secret police in the 1970s Argentina.
We say ‘essentially’ because it might be argued that many authoritarian governments actually do face both external and internal constraints, for example due to ethnic cleavages or conditions introduced by external donors. Although this is a relevant observation, it does not undermine the general point concerning the use of arms supplies by authoritarian states against pro-democratisation forces.
We could no doubt identify corrosive effects on Western democracies themselves, arising, inter alia, out of the presence of a powerful military-industrial complex. Such considerations, although intriguing in themselves, would take us far beyond the present set of concerns.
Some authors have claimed that criminal liability of arms trade exists under current international law—namely on the grounds of expectable, traceable, or predictable violations of universal human rights (see Bellal 2013, pp. 448–471).
The list of top ten exporters for the period between 2010 and 2014 reads (in millions of US dollars): 1. United States (43,876); 2. Russia (37,383); 3. China (7612); 4. Germany (7387); 5. France (7304); 6. United Kingdom (6228); 7. Spain (4102); 8. Italy (4030); 9. Ukraine (3826); 10. Israel (3345). These figures include all types of weapons and ammunition. Worth noting is the predominance of liberal democratic countries in the list (7 out of 10 if Israel is included, and 11 out of the top 15) (see SIPRI 2016; Small Arms Survey 2012).
Although Bermeo’s data cover US military aid only, generalisation is most likely possible here.
Tilly’s (2007) account of state capacity is instructive here.
Christensen’s (2015) philosophical scrutiny of arms exports proceeds on such an assumption.
In this regard, Bermeo’s (2010, p. 84) claim that ‘democracy is singular’ (whereas ‘security is plural’) proves unconvincing.
This ‘critical’ perspective on democratisation finds its counterpart in views according to which the ATT specifically and arms control in general only represent hegemonic assertion of either capitalist interests, or liberal militarism, or sovereign stateness in a Foucauldian governmentality disguise, or perhaps all at once (e.g. Krause 2011; Stavrianakis 2012, 2016). All voice the complaint that arms control efforts tend to be (naïvely) taken at face value, as presented by powerful liberal states, without looking into the ‘conceptual politics’ behind ordinary politics in the realm of arms trade. Although we share these authors’ normative concerns over a purportedly technical set of issues, we do not subscribe to the wider theoretical position they occupy (that is, critical security studies).
By contrast, scholars of security have recently begun exploring the contours of a ‘security cosmopolitanism’ of which trade in small arms constitutes an important part (Burke 2013). Still, a straightforward argument from arms trade to global democracy is missing.
There are other plausible interpretations of the notion of a basic structure, see Abizadeh (2007); the ‘impact’ version is however in line with the standard understanding of the consequences of economic globalisation.
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Acknowledgements
The paper is an output of a research project funded by the Czech Science Foundation (code GA16-13980S). We are grateful to JIRD’s anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on previous drafts of the paper; they have helped improve the argument substantially. We also want to thank Andrew L. Roberts, Petr Preclík, Hubert Smekal, Martin Chovančík, Petr Ocelík, and other participants in the Research Seminar of the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, for their views on earlier versions.
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Dufek, P., Mochtak, M. A case for global democracy? Arms exports and conflicting goals in democracy promotion. J Int Relat Dev 22, 610–639 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0114-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0114-0