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Patterns of democracy: Coalition governance and majoritarian modification in the United Kingdom, 2010–2015

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Abstract

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged which focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics that limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of the UK’s democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws on Lijphart’s two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that over the course of the 2010–2015 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled down to facilitate within-case analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK’s extant democratic architecture under the weight of pressures to which it continues to be subject.

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Source: Lijphart, 2012, p. 251

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Acknowledgements

British Academy Grant Reference Number SG131355.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield, S10 2TU, UK

    Felicity Matthews & Matthew Flinders

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  1. Felicity Matthews
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Correspondence to Felicity Matthews.

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Matthews, F., Flinders, M. Patterns of democracy: Coalition governance and majoritarian modification in the United Kingdom, 2010–2015. Br Polit 12, 157–182 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-016-0041-5

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