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Electoral Institutions and Political Competition

Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization

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Handbook of New Institutional Economics

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Authors
  1. Gary W. Cox
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

    Claude Menard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Cox, G.W. (2005). Electoral Institutions and Political Competition. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_5

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