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The Importance of Open Networks in Sustaining the Digital Revolution

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Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services be Regulated

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References

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  79. The Federal Communications Commission has been presented with a mountain of specific evidence of anticompetitive behavior by wire owners. 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  1. Consumer Federation of America, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, Stanford

    Mark Cooper

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Cooper, M. (2006). The Importance of Open Networks in Sustaining the Digital Revolution. In: Lenard, T.M., May, R.J. (eds) Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services be Regulated. Springer, Boston, MA . https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-33928-0_4

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