Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Hegelian and Heideggerian Tautologies

  • Chapter
Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book One

Part of the book series: Analecta Husserliana ((ANHU,volume 88))

  • 700 Accesses

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. 12. unveränderte Auflage (Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1972), pp. 35, 193, 318.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Heidegger, Kants These über das Sein (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1962), p. 33.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Kants These über das Sein, p. 36.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Heidegger, Vier Seminare (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1977), p. 137. “... das Denken, dem hier nachgedacht wird, nenne ich das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie.”

    Google Scholar 

  5. For example, the occurrence of the word Tautologie in Hegel is often related to the word leere (empty). See Phänomenologie III-137; Wissenschaft der Logik II-40, 97, 412; Enzyklopädie VIII-269. [All works of Hegel are cited from Werke in zwamzig Bänden (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970)].

    Google Scholar 

  6. Besides the attitude of “common quest” with Kant as expressed in Kants These über das Sein as quoted above, Heidegger has in the preface to the 4th edition of the Kant-Buch admitted that Kant was for him a kind of “refuge” (Zuflucht) when the programme of Sein und Zeit ran into impasse. See Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 4. Auflage (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1973). For a general account of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, see Hansgeorg Hoppe, “Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers”, Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 284–317.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Max Müller, Sinn-Deutungen der Geschichte. Drei philosophische Betrachtungen zur Situation. (Zürich: Edition Interfrom AG, 1976), p. 109.

    Google Scholar 

  8. For an account of Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel, see David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 213–222.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Gadamer, “Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers”, Hegel’s Dialectic, transl. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 18.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Gadamer, “The Idea of Hegel’s Logic”, Hegel’s Dialectic, ibid., p. 95.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Gadamer, “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World’”, Hegel’s Dialectic, ibid., p. 36. English modified to fit text.

    Google Scholar 

  12. See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), pp. 281–282. See also Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  13. See Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, p. 36.

    Google Scholar 

  14. In his much earlier Kant-Buch Heidegger already conceived the notion of a metaphysic of Dasein, which he depicts as “the metaphysic which necessarily is realized as Dasein (notwendig als Dasein geschehende Metaphysik), which is nothing but a “fundamental event” (Grundgeschehen). See Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 235.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Identität und Differenz, ibid., pp. 47–48.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), p. 25.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Zur Sache des Denkens, ibid., pp. 35–36.

    Google Scholar 

  18. See Tze-wan Kwan, Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie und das tautologische Denken Heideggers, (Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 1982).

    Google Scholar 

  19. For in-depth discussion of Heidegger’s Identität und Differenz, see Otto Pöggeler’s review of Heidegger’s book in Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, Band 11 (1958), pp. 294–298; and also Pöggeler’s, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 3. erweiterte Auflage, Chapter 7 (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990), p. 143ff.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Identität und Differenz, p. 22.

    Google Scholar 

  21. For a related use of the term überlassen, see Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 25.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Identität und Differenz, p. 22.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Identität und Differenz, p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Einführung in die Metaphysik, 104ff.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Identität und Differenz, p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  26. See Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Here Heidegger speaks of “the uniqueness of Seyn” (Einzigkeit des Seyns), Gesamtausgabe, Band 65, p. 73.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Heidegger applies the concept of Zwiefalt to various “ordered pairs”, such as Anwesen and Anwesendes (Usp 122–126); Sein and Seiendes (WhD 134–136), Sein and Mensch etc.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 150

    Google Scholar 

  29. Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximanders”, Holzwege (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 318. Young and Haynes have translated the term as “singular as such”, which is also fine.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Identität und Differenz, p. 29, 54.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Identität und Differenz, p. 29. “Das Wort Ereignis meint hier nicht mehr das, was wir sonst irgendein Geschehnis, ein Vorkommnis nennen. Das Wort ist jetzt als Singulare tantum gebraucht. Was es nennt, ereignet sich nur in der Einzahl, nein, nicht einmal mehr in einer Zahl, sondern einzig.”

    Google Scholar 

  32. Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 172.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I, 18. Auflage (Zürich: Weidmann, 1989), p. 161. English translation by Freeman: “When you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one.”

    Google Scholar 

  34. Heidegger, Heraklit-Vorlesungen (1943/44), Gesamtausgabe, Band 55 (Frankfurt/main: Klostermann, 1979), p. 204.

    Google Scholar 

  35. For a correlation of homologein with Ver-nehmen, see Heidegger, Heraklit-Vorlesungen, p. 260.

    Google Scholar 

  36. The term ekzentrisch appears again the Heraklit-Vorlesungen, p. 206.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 24. “Was bleibt zu sagen? Nur dies: Das Ereignis ereignet. Damit sagen wir vom Selben her auf das Selbe zu das Selbe.” English translation by Joan Stambaugh, but modified by the author.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 58.

    Google Scholar 

  39. See Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, 1971), p. 200.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Der Satz vom Grund, p. 68. An English translation would be: “The rose is without why; it blossoms, because it blossoms...”

    Google Scholar 

  41. Der Satz vom Grund, p. 200.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 121. For the topic of Seinserörterung or “topology of Being”, see Otto Pöggeler, “Metaphysik und Seinstopik bei Heidegger”, Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Band 70, 1962–63, pp. 118–137.

    Google Scholar 

  43. This was reported by Gadamer, see Hegels Dialektik, op. cit. p. 89. Noteworthy is the fact that for the later Heidegger, “being Greek” is an increasingly pejorative predicate. Among others, see Otto Pöggeler, Heidegger in seiner Zeit (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1999), p. 240; English translation by Henry Pickford, “Does the Saving Power also grow? Heidegger’s Last Paths”, Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments, edited by Christopher Macann, Vol. IV (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 414.

    Google Scholar 

  44. The term “onto-theo-ego-logisch”, tailor-made for Hegel, was used, as far as I know, only once by Heidegger. I take the liberty to change it to the substantial form. See Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, Gesamtausgabe, Band 32 (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1980), p. 183.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Heidegger describes Hegel’s Phänomenologie as “Sichanderswerden und Zusichselbstkommen des Bewusstseins”. See Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Wissenschaft der Logik II, p. 551. This passage being so important, I am quoting the original in its entirety: “Die Methode ist daraus als der sich selbst wissende, sich als das Absolute, sowohl Subjektive als Objektive, zum Gegenstande habende Begriff, somit als das reine Entsprechen des Begriffs und seiner Realität, als eine Existenz, die er selbst ist, hervorgegangen.”

    Google Scholar 

  47. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 126. Although this term appears as early as in the third chapter, its general meaning is applicable to the “self-knowing Spirit”. See also Wissenschaft der Logik II, p. 122.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Sichselbstgleichheit ist often translated as “self-identity.”

    Google Scholar 

  49. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 469.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 324.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 438.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 100.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Wissenschaft der Logik I, p. 212.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 53.

    Google Scholar 

  55. See, for examples, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 132, 316.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 94.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Enzyklopädie-I, § 25, § 79.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Enzyklopädie-I, § 80.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Enzyklopädie-I, § 81.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Heidegger/ Fink, Heraklit-Seminar, Wintersemester 1966/67 (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 184–185.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Wissenschaft der Logik II, p. 169.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Wissenschaft der Logik II, p. 246,282.

    Google Scholar 

  63. It is for this reason understandable why Heidegger puts Hegel and Husserl in one basket and has them criticized together. See “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 68ff. Fink, on the other hand, also used the contrast between infinitude and finitude as the main line of distinction between Husserl and Heidegger. See Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 25.

    Google Scholar 

  64. On this issue, see Tze-wan Kwan, “Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths”, paper presented at the Conference on Phenomenology & Buddhist Philosophy, organized by the Research Centre for Phenomenology & the Human Sciences, RIH, CUHK, in collaboration with Chilin Nunnery, Hong Kong. Held February 13–14, 2004, in Hong Kong. Pending for publication.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, (ed.) by Ronald Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), p. 314

    Google Scholar 

  66. Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges, ibid, p. 319

    Google Scholar 

  67. In an earlier paper presented at the first O-P-O conference held in Prague, I have criticized Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity from a cross cultural point of view. See Tze-wan Kwan, “Subject and Person as Two Self-Images of Modern Man — Some Cross-Cultural Perspectives”, now available at the URL: http://www.o-p-o.net/essays/KwanArticle.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  68. Ernst Cassirer, “Philosophy and Politics”, Symbols, Myth, and Culture. Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935–1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 230.

    Google Scholar 

  69. This expression is formulated by Thomas Sheehan; see his review of Wolin’s and Rockmore’s books, Ethics, Vol. 103/1, October 1992, pp. 178–181. Regarding Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, I can not help but agree with Rockmore, that Heidegger must have undermined the freedom of man under Nazism since he “offered the main role to Being.” See Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy (London: Harvester, 1992), p. 290.

    Google Scholar 

  70. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 22.

    Google Scholar 

  71. In fact, Heidegger was consciously speaking against the Hegelian method of Aufhebung when he proposed “stepping back” as a key to his era of Thinking. See Identität und Differenz, p. 45.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Kant, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Band XVIII (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928), p. 80. Refl. 5075: “In der transzendentalen Wissenschaft ist nicht mehr darum zu thun, vorwärts, sondern zurück zu gehen.”

    Google Scholar 

  73. See Kant’s Prolegommena..., Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Band IV (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1903), p. 373.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Tze-Wan Kwan

Authors
  1. Tze-Wan Kwan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The World Phenomenology Institute, Hanover, NH, USA

    Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kwan, TW. (2005). Hegelian and Heideggerian Tautologies. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book One. Analecta Husserliana, vol 88. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3680-9_16

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation