Skip to main content

Detecting Collusion Attacks in Security Protocols

  • Conference paper
Frontiers of WWW Research and Development - APWeb 2006 (APWeb 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3841))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Security protocols have been widely used to safeguard secure electronic transactions. We usually assume that principals are credible and shall not maliciously disclose their individual secrets to someone else. Nevertheless, it is impractical to completely ignore the possibility that some principals may collude in private to achieve a fraudulent or illegal purpose. Therefore, it is critical to address the possibility of collusion attacks in order to correctly analyse security protocols. This paper proposes a framework by which to detect collusion attacks in security protocols. The possibility of security threats from insiders is especially taken into account. The case study demonstrates that our methods are useful and promising in discovering and preventing collusion attacks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.: A logic for Authentication. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 8(1), 18–36 (1990)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Zhang, C., Zhang, S.: Association Rule Mining: Models and Algorithms. In: Zhang, C., Zhang, S. (eds.) Association Rule Mining. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2307. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Denning, D., Sacco, G.: Timestamp in Key Distribution Protocols. Communications of ACM 24(8), 533–536 (1981)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Chen, Q., Zhang, C., Zhang, S.: ENDL: A Logical Framework for Verifying Secure Transaction Protocols. Knowledge and Information Systems 7(1), 84–109 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Heintze, N., Tygar, J., Wing, J., Wong, H.: Model Checking Electronic Commerce Protocols. In: Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, Oakland, California, pp. 147–164 (November 1996)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Boneh, D., Shaw, J.: Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 44(5), 1897–1905 (1998)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Celik, M.U., Sharma, G., Tekalp, A.M.: Collusion-resilient fingerprinting using random pre-warping. In: Proceeding of IEEE International Conference of Image Processing, pp. 509–512 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bratko, I.: Prolog Programming for Artificial Intelligence. Addison-Wesley, Reading (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  9. SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book 1: Business Description, Version 1.0, May 31 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chen, Q., Chen, YP.P., Zhang, S., Zhang, C. (2006). Detecting Collusion Attacks in Security Protocols. In: Zhou, X., Li, J., Shen, H.T., Kitsuregawa, M., Zhang, Y. (eds) Frontiers of WWW Research and Development - APWeb 2006. APWeb 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11610113_27

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11610113_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-31142-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32437-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics