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Algorithms for Distributed Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms (AMEC 2005, TADA 2005)

Abstract

The problem of optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions consists of finding the set of bids that maximize the revenue for the sellers. Various solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions which eliminates the centralized auctioneer. We present a set of distributed search-based algorithms for solving this problem and study their relative tradeoffs.

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Narumanchi, M.V., Vidal, J.M. (2006). Algorithms for Distributed Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. In: La Poutré, H., Sadeh, N.M., Janson, S. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms. AMEC TADA 2005 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3937. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-46242-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46243-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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