Summary
This paper provides an overview of the research activities that have already been undertaken regarding the development and implementation of the idea of the Turing Tournament. This is a two-sided Tournament designed to encourage improvement of the existing as well as creation of new models of human behavior, emulators, that will be capable of replicating the main features that characterize behavior of experimental human subjects in a variety of economic environments. The other side of the Tournament is represented by the algorithms designed to distinguish between machine and human generated behavior. The paper discusses general design questions and its first implementation within the context of repeated games. Finally, the paper describes further stages of the Tournament development which will include its implementation in more complicated economic environments with larger strategy space.
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Arifovic, J. (2005). The Implementation of the Turing Tournament: A Report. In: Lux, T., Samanidou, E., Reitz, S. (eds) Nonlinear Dynamics and Heterogeneous Interacting Agents. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 550. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27296-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27296-8_1
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