Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Akerlof, G. (1980): A theory of social custom, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 749–75.
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1973): The property rights paradigm, Journal of Economic History.
Aoki, M. (2001): Toward a comparative institutional analysis, MIT Press
Binmore, K. (1992): Fun and games, Heath.
Boyer, R. (2004): La théorie de la régulation, Repères, La Découverte.
Boyer, R., and Orléan, A. (1992): How do conventions evolve?, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2, 165–177.
Coase, R.H. (1937): The nature of the firm“, Economica.
Commons, J.R. (1934): Institutional Economics, University of Wisconsin Press.
Demsetz, H. (1967): Toward a theory of property rights, American Economic Review.
von Hayek, F. (1973): Law, legislation and liberty, University of Chicago Press.
Kreps, D. (1990): Corporate culture and economic theory, in J.E. Alt — K.A. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on positive political economics, Cambridge University Press, 90–143.
Leibenstein, H. (1982): The prisoner’s dilemma in the invisible hand: an analysis of intra-firm productivity, American Economic Review, 2, 92–97.
Lewis, D. (1969): Convention, a philosophical study, Harvard University Press.
Mitchell, W.C. (1935): Commons on institutional economics, American Economic Review.
von Neuman, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944): Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press.
Orléan, A. (2004): L’économie des conventions: définitions et résultats, in A. Orléan (ed.), Analyse Economique des conventions, Presses Universitaires de France, 9–48.
Schotter, A. (1981): The economic theory of social institutions, Cambridge University Press.
Sethi, R. (1999): Evolutionary stability and media of exchange, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization.
Sugden, R. (1986): The Evolution of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Basil Blackwell.
Sugden, R. (1989): Spontaneous order, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 85–97.
Ullman-Margalit, E. (1977): The emergence of norms, Oxford University Press.
Veblen, T. (1899): The theory of the leisure class, Mc Millan.
Walliser, B. (2005): Game theory and emergence of institutions, mimeo.
Williamson, O. (1975): Markets and hierarchies, Free Press.
Young, H.P. (1993a): The evolution of conventions, Econometrica, 61(1), 57–84.
Young, H.P. (1993b): An Evolutionary model of bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 145–68.
Young, H.P. (1996): The economics of convention, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2), 105–122.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2006). Emergence of institutions. In: Evolutionary Microeconomics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28537-7_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28537-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28536-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-28537-3
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)