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Grundmodelle der direkten und der indirekten Demokratie

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Wirtschaftspolitik

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(2006). Grundmodelle der direkten und der indirekten Demokratie. In: Wirtschaftspolitik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32558-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-32558-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-32557-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32558-1

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics (German Language)

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