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The Security of a Mix-Center Based on a Semantically Secure Cryptosystem

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Progress in Cryptology — INDOCRYPT 2002 (INDOCRYPT 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2551))

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Abstract

We introduce a definition of a re-encryption mix-center, and a definition of security for such a mix-center. Then we prove that any semantically secure public key system, which allows re-encryption, can be used to construct a secure mix-center.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS), Sweden

    Douglas Wikström

Authors
  1. Douglas Wikström
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Alfred Menezes

  2. Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203, B.T. Road, 700108, Kolkata, India

    Palash Sarkar

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Wikström, D. (2002). The Security of a Mix-Center Based on a Semantically Secure Cryptosystem. In: Menezes, A., Sarkar, P. (eds) Progress in Cryptology — INDOCRYPT 2002. INDOCRYPT 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2551. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36231-2_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36231-2_29

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00263-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36231-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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