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Weak Forward Security in Mediated RSA

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Security in Communication Networks (SCN 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2576))

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Abstract

Mediated RSA (mRSA) [1] is a simple and practical method of splitting RSA private keys between the user and the Security Mediator (SEM). Neither the user nor the SEM can cheat each other since a signature or a decryption must involve both parties. mRSA allows fast and fine-grained control (revocation) of users’ security priviliges. Forward security is an important and desirable feature for signature schemes. Despite some notable recent results, no forward-secure RSA variant has been developed. In this paper (abstract), we show how weak forward security can be efficiently obtained with mediated RSA. We consider several methods, based on both multiplicative and additive mRSA and discuss their respective merits.

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References

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Tsudik, G. (2003). Weak Forward Security in Mediated RSA. In: Cimato, S., Persiano, G., Galdi, C. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00420-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36413-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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