Abstract
We show that a randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to SPA attack, a kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. A side channel attack is an attack that takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure has been proposed by Oswald-Aigner, and is a random decision inserted into computations. However, its immunity to side channel attacks is still controversial. As for timing attack, a kind of side channel attack, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure is also vulnerable. Moreover, compared with other countermeasures against side channel attacks, the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure, after being improved to prevent side channel attacks, is much slower.
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Okeya, K., Sakurai, K. (2002). On Insecurity of the Side Channel Attack Countermeasure Using Addition-Subtraction Chains under Distinguishability between Addition and Doubling. In: Batten, L., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2384. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_32
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