Abstract
In this paper, we address the question of providing security proofs for signature schemes in the so-called random oracle model [1]. In particular, we establish the generality of this technique against adaptively chosen message attacks. Our main application achieves such a security proof for a slight variant of the El Gamal signature scheme [4] where committed values are hashed together with the message. This is a rather surprising result since the original El Gamal is, as RSA [11], subject to existential forgery.
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Pointcheval, D., Stern, J. (1996). Security Proofs for Signature Schemes. In: Maurer, U. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96. EUROCRYPT 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1070. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_33
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