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Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

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Abstract

In Chapter 4, I argued that the interpretation and explanation of action owes much to situational factors. Given that situational understanding is normative, it can account not only for why an action was performed but also for why it ought to have been performed. Furthermore, it can do so without involving propositional attitudes. Not all situational understanding relates to particular actions. For example, interpretations of what commuters do every morning and evening address routine and lengthy patterns of activity. But there are plenty of other cases where situational factors enable us to understand or explain why a specific action was performed, perhaps by showing that a seemingly anomalous action was, after all, warranted given a situation. For example, ‘why did he just get up and leave?’ can be met with ‘because he’s 17 years old and people under 18 aren’t allowed in this bar after 6.00 pm’. However, the question ‘why did A do p?’ already assumes that an action of some description has been performed by A, even though the reason for its performance is unknown. It might be argued that taking something to be an action requires a grasp of FP. As indicated by the developmental evidence discussed in Chapter 4, it is unlikely that an ability to attribute internal propositional attitudes is required in order to recognise a behaviour as an action.

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© 2007 Matthew Ratcliffe

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Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Perceiving Actions. In: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-62529-7_5

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