Abstract
Most contributions on the relation between common knowledge/belief of rationality and backward induction in perfect information games perform the analysis in the extensive form of the game. Indeed, the analyses in Chapters 7 and 8 of this book are examples of this. An exception to this rule is Schuhmacher (1999) who—based on Myerson’s (1978) concept of a proper equilibrium, but without making equilibrium assumptions—defines the concept of proper rationalizability in the strategic form and shows that proper rationalizable play leads to back-ward induction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2006). Properness. In: The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 37. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-26237-6_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-26237-6_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-26235-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-26237-6
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)