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Economic Models of Communication Networks

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Performance Modeling and Engineering

Standard performance evaluations of communication networks focus on the technology layer where protocols define precise rules of operations. Those studies assume a model of network utilization and of network characteristics and derive performance measures. However, performance affects how users utilize the network. Also, investments by network providers affect performance and consequently network utilization. We call the actions of users and network providers the “economic layer” of the network because their decisions depend largely on economic incentives. The economic and technology layers interact in a complex way and they should be studied together. This tutorial explores economic models of networks that combine the economic and technology layers.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of EECS, University of California at Berkeley, USA

    Jean Walrand

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  1. Jean Walrand
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, 19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY, 10533

    Zhen Liu  & Cathy H. Xia  & 

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Walrand, J. (2008). Economic Models of Communication Networks. In: Liu, Z., Xia, C.H. (eds) Performance Modeling and Engineering. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-79361-0_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-79361-0_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-79360-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-79361-0

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