Abstract
This book presents a critical examination of executive-congressional relations and the domestic politics of arms control treaty ratification within the United States during the twentieth century. The starting point of this study is the hypothesis that the politics of treaty ratification can be as important as the negotiations leading up to agreements. Benefits to international peace and security sought in years of painstaking diplomatic effort can be lost without Senate consent, as was the case with the Treaty of Versailles and the second treaty arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (salt ii). Despite the substantial importance of this subject, the politics of treaty ratification is a relatively unexplored area, particularly compared with the volumes of studies and memoirs concerning past arms control negotiations.
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Notes
See Kenneth Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944);
Alan Cranston, The Killing of the Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1960);
Royden Dangerfield, In Defense of the Senate: A Study in Treaty Making (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1933); and
Denna Frank Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1930).
For more recent studies, see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
and William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–60.
Mary H. Cooper, “Treaty Ratification,” Editorial Research Reports (January 29, 1988): 42.
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, “Appendix: Theory for Policy in International Relations,” in Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 636.
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 95–97; Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison,” in Diplomatic History: New Approaches, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, (New York: Free Press, 1979), 107–20;
and Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations: A Research Annual, ed. Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith, vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 21–58.
Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977);
Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations: From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981);
Alexander L. George, Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983);
and Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Hedley Bull, “Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties,” in SALT: Problems and Prospects, ed. Morton A. Kaplan, (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973),
and Roger Dingman, “Statesmen, Admirals and SALT: The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922” (Santa Monica: California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, December 1972),
For the texts and brief descriptions of these agreements and others, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982).
Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970).
Glenn T. Seaborg with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981),
and Glen T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987).
Dan Caldwell, The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).
Michael Krepon, Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
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© 1991 Henry L. Stimson Center
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Caldwell, D. (1991). Introduction. In: Krepon, M., Caldwell, D. (eds) The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04534-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04534-8_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-60585-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-04534-8
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