Abstract
It may seem that since the present account purports to deal with all values by referring them to corresponding desires, no justice can be done to the insights of those who have insisted on the autonomy of moral values, or the special character, for instance, of aesthetic values. To take a more specific objection of the same kind, it may seem that no justice can be done to cases described and experienced as cases of conflict between a moral principle and a desire.
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© 1978 F. C. T. Moore
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Moore, F.C.T. (1978). Species of Value. In: The Psychological Basis of Morality. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03735-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03735-3_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-03737-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-03735-3
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