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Abstract

In September 1914, the Foreign Office and Wellington House were in complete agreement that by far the most important of neutral countries was the United States of America. The reasons for this were obvious. On the outbreak of the First World War, Britain and Germany had lost each other’s best customer in economic and commercial terms. It was essential for them both to compensate for this loss by increasing their trade with the rapidly expanding economic might of the United States or, better still, to entice the Americans into joining their cause. For the next two and a half years, British and German propagandists fought an intense and widespread propaganda campaign designed to win American sympathy and all the benefits that entailed. It was a battle only one side could win, if it could be won at all. Both sides held their advantages. The Germans had their considerable share in the American electorate through the organised and intensely patriotic bunds of German emigrés. The British shared a common language and culture and, thanks to the prompt action of the cable ship Telconia, they alone enjoyed direct cable communications with the North American continent. It might well have been the case that the British were bound to win. Wellington House was more concerned with not losing.

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Notes

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© 1982 M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor

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Sanders, M.L., Taylor, P.M. (1982). British Propaganda in the United States. In: British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914–18. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05544-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05544-9_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-29275-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-05544-9

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