Abstract
It can be argued that ‘thoughts’ of various kinds are already sociological data and topics of inquiry, for people’s ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘opinions’ have long been probed and correlated with other things by social scientists. Leaving questions of methodological adequacy to one side, it is clear that some corpus of social-scientific knowledge-claims contains reference to the thoughts that people are supposed to have entertained about a host of matters, from the most locally specific item to the most global, historical course of events. The actual data of thoughts collected sociologically consist of spoken or written answers to questions; meaningful utterances constitute the ‘thoughts’ themselves for purposes of inquiry. Of course, the perennial question is: do these utterances represent respondents’ real thoughts about the issue at hand? Although this question sometimes takes on a metaphysical tinge, it is usually resolvable by reference to (commonsense) observation of respondents’ relevant courses of action. (Not that such connections are routinely made as a matter of empirical procedure, of course; too often we are expected to swallow claims about people’s thoughts on the basis of evidence gathered through a questionnaire or interview schedule which, if gathered without such trappings, would hardly convince an intelligent layman who knows that deeds can belie words.)
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Notes
Locke developed this view in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. A. C. Fraser, 1894 republished in N.Y., 1959).
The description of Lockean theories of meaning as ‘synchronous act theories’ is due to Jonathan Bennett. See his Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) esp. pp. 1–11.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968) para. 329. See also his remarks on p. 176.
Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind (Random House, N.Y., 1967) pp. 98–9.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Harper, 1965) p. 7.
L. Wittgenstein, Zettel (eds. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright; trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967) para. no.
Gilbert Ryle, ‘Thinking and Reflecting’, in The Human Agent (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, No. 18, 1966–67) and
‘The Thinking of Thoughts’, University of Saskatchewan University Lectures, No. 18, (1968).
P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience (Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 243.
F. N. Sibley, ‘Ryle and Thinking’ in O. P. Wood & G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (Macmillan Modern Studies in Philosophy, 1971) p. 102.
See, e.g., J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (T. Crowell, 1975).
L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (eds. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe: trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; M.I.T. Press 1972) paras. 131 & 133, p. 41e.
David Pears, Wittgenstein (Fontana Modern Masters, 1971) p. 168.
Steven Lukes, ‘Some Problems About Rationality’ in Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Basil Blackwell, 1974) pp. 209–10.
Peter McHugh, ‘A Common-Sense Conception of Deviance’ in Jack D. Douglas (ed.) Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings (Basic Books, N.Y., 1970) p. 69.
In this, McHugh draws upon the work of Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (Humanities Press, N.Y., 1963) esp. pp. 112–13.
N. Cameron, ‘Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics’ in Max Hamilton (ed.), Abnormal Psychology (Penguin, 1967) p. 165.
J. S. Bruner et al., A Study of Thinking (John Wiley, N.Y., 1956).
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Penguin University Books, 1973 ed.) pp. 17, 20, 26–7, etc.
Harvey Sacks, Lecture 9, November 2, 1967 (U. C. Irvine: mimeo).
See Roger Squires, ‘Silent Soliloquy’ in Understanding Wittgenstein: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 7, 1972–73 (Macmillan, 1974).
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© 1979 Jeff Coulter
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Coulter, J. (1979). Some Thoughts on Thinking. In: The Social Construction of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09379-3_6
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