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Some Thoughts on Thinking

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The Social Construction of Mind
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Abstract

It can be argued that ‘thoughts’ of various kinds are already sociological data and topics of inquiry, for people’s ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘opinions’ have long been probed and correlated with other things by social scientists. Leaving questions of methodological adequacy to one side, it is clear that some corpus of social-scientific knowledge-claims contains reference to the thoughts that people are supposed to have entertained about a host of matters, from the most locally specific item to the most global, historical course of events. The actual data of thoughts collected sociologically consist of spoken or written answers to questions; meaningful utterances constitute the ‘thoughts’ themselves for purposes of inquiry. Of course, the perennial question is: do these utterances represent respondents’ real thoughts about the issue at hand? Although this question sometimes takes on a metaphysical tinge, it is usually resolvable by reference to (commonsense) observation of respondents’ relevant courses of action. (Not that such connections are routinely made as a matter of empirical procedure, of course; too often we are expected to swallow claims about people’s thoughts on the basis of evidence gathered through a questionnaire or interview schedule which, if gathered without such trappings, would hardly convince an intelligent layman who knows that deeds can belie words.)

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Notes

  1. Locke developed this view in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. A. C. Fraser, 1894 republished in N.Y., 1959).

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  2. The description of Lockean theories of meaning as ‘synchronous act theories’ is due to Jonathan Bennett. See his Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971) esp. pp. 1–11.

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  3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968) para. 329. See also his remarks on p. 176.

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  16. In this, McHugh draws upon the work of Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (Humanities Press, N.Y., 1963) esp. pp. 112–13.

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  20. Harvey Sacks, Lecture 9, November 2, 1967 (U. C. Irvine: mimeo).

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  21. See Roger Squires, ‘Silent Soliloquy’ in Understanding Wittgenstein: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 7, 1972–73 (Macmillan, 1974).

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© 1979 Jeff Coulter

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Coulter, J. (1979). Some Thoughts on Thinking. In: The Social Construction of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09379-3_6

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