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Economy, Democracy and Bureaucracy

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Economy and Democracy

Part of the book series: British Association for the Advancement of Science ((BAAS))

Abstract

Public sector bureaucracy is regarded by many to be a major social problem. It is often regarded in pejorative terms to represent inefficiency, wastefulness, a haven of privilege, and a threat to the ideals of a democratic society. The growth of bureaucracy is viewed with suspicion; stimulates much political debate and generally receives a bad press. Bureaucracy is the object of ridicule; the subject of investigative journalism; and forms the subject matter of polemical tracts on the future direction of society. The growth of bureaucracy has brought forth charges of unrepresentativeness and demands for a reduction in the size of government. Even those sympathetic to the ideals of government have criticised bureaucracy for failing to carry out legislative intent and for being insensitive to the needs of the average citizen.

The phenomenon of abdication to bureaucratic directives in corporations, in trades unions, in parties and in cooperatives is so widespread that it indicates a fundamental weakness of democracy. (Selznick, 1949, p. 9)

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Authors
  1. Peter Jackson
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R. C. O. Matthews

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© 1985 The British Association for the Advancement of Science

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Jackson, P. (1985). Economy, Democracy and Bureaucracy. In: Matthews, R.C.O. (eds) Economy and Democracy. British Association for the Advancement of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17970-1_7

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