Abstract
The game nicknamed ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ by A.W. Tucker has attracted wide attention, doubtless because it has raised doubts about the universal applicability of the so called Sure-thing Principle as a principle of rational decision.
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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Rapoport, A. (1989). Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_23
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