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Part of the book series: The Making of the 20th Century ((MACE))

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Abstract

Economic calculation was yet another source of French ambivalence, that is to say the relationship between the country’s productive resources and the demands placed upon them by the German problem. This calculation already has figured in our analysis, however implicitly, for in many respects it is at the foundation of the ideological debate. The political left, which characteristically associated themselves with the ordinary citizen, saw fascism as the primary evil of their time. Its emphasis upon nationalism and social discipline was antithetical to the interests of workers who needed international peace as a condition for improving their lot at home. Indeed, French socialists and communists subscribed to the view that fascism was nothing more than a particularly ugly form of capitalism. The political right, which characteristically attracted spokesmen from the possessing classes, saw fascism differently. Most, it would be fair to say, did not see it as an appropriate answer to their concerns; but in the anti-left protestations of the regimes in Berlin and Rome, they did see a commendable resistance to what they regarded as the primary evil of their time: socialism-communism. As for the political centre, and once more characteristically, its practitioners were people of modest fortunes whose concerns about Marxist-inspired property expropriations were at least partially offset by alarm over fascist incursions into civil liberties.

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Notes

  1. See Young , ‘Reason and Madness: France, The Axis Powers and the Politics of Economic Disorder’, Canadian Journal of History, xx (April 1985) 65–83.

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  2. Poncet to Bonnet, 27 June 1938, Documents Diplomatiques Français D.D.F., 2e, x, no. 103, p. 200; and 13 October 1938, ibid., xii, no. 105, p. 177. See also Robert Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler (Paris: Hachette, 1950) 205–6.

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  3. The Finance ministry in Paris was inclined to be more hopeful of some effective resistance to Nazi economic policies, more hopeful than the attachés in Berlin. See Nathalie Carré de Malberg, ‘Les attachés financiers en 1938 — technocrates ou techniciens? — et la perception de la puissance de la France’, Relations Internationales, no. 33 (Spring 1983) 43–64. For British doubts about imminent domestic resistance, see Bruce Strang, ‘Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Nevile Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, v, no. 1 (March 1994) 119, 120, 122, 125.

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  4. For example, see Coulondre to Bonnet, 5 February 1939, D.D.F., 2e, xiv, no. 18, p. 33. For Hitler’s ability to turn the threat of an allied blockade into an argument for expansion in eastern Europe, see R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (New York: St. Martin’s 1993) 268.

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  5. See André François-Poncet, Souvenirs d’une ambassade à Berlin (Paris: Flammarion, 1946) 319, 348;

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  6. Coulondre , Souvenirs (Paris: Hachette, 1950) 319–325; Didelet to Daladier, 12 December 1938, DDF., 2e, xiii, no. 103, p. 192, and his report of 11 April 1939, in the army archives Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (S.H.A.T.) 7N2602.

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  7. See the unpublished manuscript entitled ‘Munich’ by Edouard Daladier, in Archives Daladier, 2DA1, dossier 5, p. 45; and Young A, ‘French Military Intelligence,’ in May (ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 271–309.

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  8. While avoiding specific and concrete forecasts of attack, both military and civilian observers certainly kept the idea alive in the public consciousness by frequently, and publicly, hypothesizing about future German attacks. See Young , ‘L’Attaque Brusquée and Its Use as Myth in Interwar France’, Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, viii, no. 1 (Spring 1981) 93–113.

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  9. See Robert Frank(enstein), Le prix du réarmement français, 1935–1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982) 109.

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  10. For the relationship between diplomatic and financial crisis in March 1936, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, see Stephen A. Schuker, ‘France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936’, French Historical Studies, xiv, no. 3 (Spring 1986) 299–338.

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  26. For an examination of Franco-German commercial exchanges between 1936 and 1939, see Gordon Dutter, ‘Doing Business with the Nazis: French Economic Relations with Germany under the Popular Front’, Journal of Modern History (1991) 296–326; Raymond Poidevin, ‘La tentative de rapprochement économique entre la France et l’Allemagne, 1938–1939’, in Jacques Bariéty, Alfred Guth and Jean-Marie Valentin (eds) La France et l’Allemagne entre les deux guerres mondiales (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1987) 59–68.

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© 1996 Robert J. Young

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Young, R.J. (1996). Economic Prophecies and Counter-Prophecies. In: France and the Origins of the Second World War. The Making of the 20th Century. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24890-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24890-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-57553-6

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