Realpolitik and Militarism, 1871–90

Abstract

The map of Europe and the distribution of power in 1871 was very different from that devised at Vienna in 1814–15. It was also a map which, except for south-east Europe, was to remain unchanged until the First World War. Germany had clearly displaced France as the most formidable continental power, the latter having no foreseeable prospect of reversing the verdict of the 1870–1 war except with the help of a powerful land ally. Russia was still largely on the defensive despite the repeal of the Black Sea clauses at a conference in London (March 1871). She had huge potential, but was a long way from realising it. Austria-Hungary could look realistically only to parts of south-east Europe for additional influence or territory. Yet even in this region there existed both internal and external reasons why she too might find it difficult to take the initiative. The future of Italy, the weakest of the powers, was largely dependent on the opportunities presented to her by the needs and setbacks of other powers. Finally the British, despite some initial fears of the new Germany, were fairly quickly persuaded that Bismarck was content with the new frontiers. A British diplomat confidently predicted that Europe would enjoy greater peace and stability with the ‘rooting up, once and for all, of the pretension of France to a privileged and exceptional position in Europe’. Germany was thus well placed — at least for the time being — to maintain her new ascendancy in the heart of Europe.

‘All politics reduces itself to this formula: try to be one of three, as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers.’ (Bismarck)