Abstract
In this chapter, we are interested in a procurement network formation problem. We present a case for modelling the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game. We investigate recent results in shortest path cooperative games and their implications to the procurement network formation problem. We then enhance the model for procurement network formation by incorporating asymmetry in the information that agents have. Specifically, we model the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game with incomplete information. We point out the incentive compatible core as an appropriate solution concept for this category of games. We then review the current state of the art on the topic of incentive compatible core, pose a conjecture and end with some directions for future work.
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Chandrashekar, T.S., Narahari, Y. (2011). Procurement Network Formation: A Cooperative Game Approach. In: Kempf, K., Keskinocak, P., Uzsoy, R. (eds) Planning Production and Inventories in the Extended Enterprise. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 152. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8191-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8191-2_8
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